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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
The Impact of Public Educational Investments and Educational Spillovers on the
Economic Growth of States: Are State Educational Investments Affecting Earnings
and Employment?
The first chapter provides an introduction to my investigation of the impact of state-
level educational investments in public K-12 education on future labor markets, specif-
ically earnings and employment. In Chapter 2, the current literature supporting this
investigation is examined while I offer a hole in the literature that I intend to fill.
Then, in Chapter 3 I present a two-period, balanced-budget theoretical model in
which I relate educational investments, mobility, and future earnings. This theo-
retical model is then implemented in Chapter 4 using state-level data and again in
Chapter 5 using individual-level data.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of state-level educational investments in public
education on aggregate state labor markets, specifically earnings and employment.
Using data on K-12 educational spending, 8th grade cognitive test scores, and edu-
cational demographics of a state’s labor force, I observe the impact these state-level
investments have on employment and earnings growth. Taking interstate migration
into account, I separate the benefits from educational investment into benefits due
to in-state investment and benefits due to out-of-state investment. By doing so I am
able to identify whether or not educational investment spillovers exist between states.
Results indicate that the earnings benefits associated with public K-12 educational
spending spill over into other states, 8th grade NAEP test scores do not spill over
into other states, and neither has a significant impact on other states’ employment
growth.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of educational investments in public education on
earnings of individuals. I extend my analysis from Chapter 4 by employing micro-data
(on individuals) from the American Community Survey (ACS) instead of using state-
level data. Using micro-data allows me to more accurately measure the investments
used in the education of an area and to incorporate where education was attained and
where it was employed. Using individual-level data also allows me to narrow my focus
to younger participants in the labor force, providing a stronger link between lagged
educational spending and earnings. Results indicate that K-12 educational spending
does spill over in the form of positive earnings benefits, which helps to support the
results of Chapter 4.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Historically, K-12 educational spending was largely funded by local governments.1
However, in the 1970’s state government contributions for education started to meet
and in some years even surpass contributions of local governments for educational
spending. In fact, in 2014, state governments funded approximately 46% of total
educational spending, while local governments funded approximately 45%.2
As seen in Figure 1.1, K-12 educational spending per pupil has substantially in-
creased since 1990. Although spending has persistently increased, spending across
states varies dramatically. In 2014, current educational spending per pupil in the
U.S. averaged $11,009, but that average covered a wide variation across states, rang-
ing from $6,500 in Utah to $20,610 in New York.3 Figure 1.2 below illustrates the
wide range of educational spending values per pupil in 2014 for all states.
Part of this variation in spending across states is obviously due to differences
in costs of living as well as how state economies responded to the recession–many
states are still spending less on education than before the recession.4 The variation
in educational spending across states can also be attributed to political differences.5
At the same time, states also choose if and how they target funds to districts with
low-income families who are less able to raise funds through property taxes compared
to their wealthier counterparts. Naturally, these differences across states lead to
questions of how returns to education vary across states. That states now have
more control over educational funding and curricula offers motivation to examine
1Source: Federal Education Budget Project (2014).
2Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 Annual Survey of School System Finances.
3Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 Annual Survey of School System Finances.
4December 2015: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: 25 states funding K-12 education at
sub-2008 levels.
5Source: The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
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Figure 1.1: Real Educational Spending
Figure 1.2: State Variation of 2014 Educational Spending
educational investments and their effects at the state level.
Educational funding and reform continue to be controversial. This being the case,
determining the impact of educational spending spillovers as well as the potential ben-
efits of educational spending, in terms of future earnings and employment growth, is
an important task. Although the amount of government funds allocated to educa-
tion does not necessarily measure the quality of that education or determine student
2
performance6, knowing the relationship between funding and labor market outcomes
could be useful when making future policy decisions.
A primary outcome of education for the individual receiving the education is their
increased productivity. Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 below show employment rates and
mean wages by educational attainment.7
In addition to the private returns an individual receives by having more educa-
tion, individuals who are more educated benefit those around them. The individuals
who receive education become skilled workers who tend to cause worker-to-worker
spillovers that result in increases in other employees’ productivity as well.8 For exam-
ple, Marshall (1890) and Lucas (1988) emphasize a model of human capital spillovers
in which skilled workers generate positive externalities on others around them. These
externalities occur because the workers learn from each other and the more skilled
workers share their knowledge and skills; in this way, the interaction between indi-
viduals is the mechanism which causes the worker-to-worker spillover.
While education is provided and primarily funded at the state and local levels,
extensive migration makes it likely that states that benefit from the education of their
workforce are not the same as the states that fund this education. Better schools and
better education not only lead to a more skilled labor force, but can also attract skilled
laborers from other areas. Through labor migration, skills and knowledge acquired in
one state cross state borders and are employed in another state. When this occurs,
an educational investment spillover has taken place. The first state bears the cost of
education, while the second state receives the future benefits, such as a more skilled
labor force with increased tax revenues.
6Hanushek (1981) suggests that there is no relationship between expenditures and student
achievement.
7Both figures come from “Does higher education really lead to higher employability and wages
in the RMI?" by Ben Graham and Charles Paul.
8Gruber (2004); Lucas (1988); Moretti (2004); Marshall (1890) all contribute to these findings.
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Figure 1.3: Employment Rates by Educational Attainment
Educational investment also provides many non-monetary benefits to society. For
example, Dee (2004), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and Milligan et al. (2004) find that in-
creased education promotes civic activity and good governance. In addition, Deming
(2011), Lochner (2011), and Lochner and Moretti (2004) show that increased educa-
tion leads to lower crime rates. Futhermore, while Kenkel (1991), Lochner (2011),
and Wheeler (2007) find that higher education can lead people to live in ways that
contribute more to public health, Wolfe and Haveman (2002) identifies returns to
education such as intrafamily productivity, marital choice efficiency, and health of
children.
While there are numerous possible benefits associated with educational spending,
in this investigation, I focus on the benefits to aggregate future earnings9 and em-
ployment. More specifically, this dissertation evaluates the existence of educational
9Here, earnings refer to earnings per employed persons.
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Figure 1.4: Mean Wages by Educational Attainment
investment spillovers on labor market outcomes across state borders. While there
is an extensive literature examining the relationship between educational attainment
for individuals and their labor market outcomes, there is much less evidence on how
educational investment within a state affects future aggregate employment and earn-
ings within that state, presumably a motivation for state-support of both K-12 and
higher education. Examination at the aggregate state level allows for the inclusion
of educational externalities affecting overall productivity (Moretti, 2004) and offers
evidence about whether states appear to be providing education at levels consistent
with maximizing future employment and earnings.
Past research including Berger and Fisher (2013), French and Fisher (2009), and
Bauer et al. (2006) measure the private returns to education and have shown that
higher educational attainment leads to higher median wages. By examining state-level
data, Berger and Fisher (2013) report that by investing in education and therefore
increasing the number of well-educated workers in a state, states can increase the
5
strength of their economies. French and Fisher (2009) also find that more educated
individuals are more likely to participate and to succeed in the job market. Using
state-level data for 1939-2004, Bauer et al. (2006) conclude that the main factors con-
tributing to per capita income growth are a state’s high school and college attainment
rates as well as its stock of patents.
In addition, Moretti (2004) provides evidence to support the claim that more
educated individuals increase the wages of less-educated individuals, proposing that
educational externalities exist. Moretti concludes that a one percentage point increase
in the supply of college graduates raises college graduates’ wages by 0.4%, wages of
high school graduates by 1.6%, and wages of high school drop-outs by 1.9%. It is
important to investigate the returns to schooling at a broader, overall state level
because returns to education extend passed just the individual returns; because there
are external returns playing a part as well Moretti (2004).
In contrast to previous studies that use the level of educational attainment to
measure the impacts of educational resources on individuals, I examine the impacts
of both educational spending and educational achievement on state-level earnings and
employment. In addition to examining the effects of different educational investments,
I develop a simple theoretical model that allows me to estimate the relationship be-
tween state-level investments and future earnings. Determining the potential effect
of educational investments on lifetime benefits can provide important policy impli-
cations as well as provide insights as to what factors impact future earnings and
employment. For example, if educational funding is provided at an insufficient level,
human capital is underinvested and as a result, economic growth and improvements
in social welfare would be slower than they otherwise could be (McMahon, 1997).
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
literature review and discusses the most relevant papers supporting my investigation,
while Chapter 3 presents the model and its theoretical background. Then, in the
6
following two chapters, my theoretical analysis is extended into empirical estimations
using aggregate, state-level data (Chapter 4) and individual-level, micro data (Chap-
ter 5). Finally, Chapter 6 provides a conclusion for this dissertation. In Chapter 4,
I use a variety of publicly available data sources to construct a 43-year panel from
1972-2014. This dataset includes variables such as income, expenditures, and K-12 ed-
ucation characteristics. My strategy involves disaggregating educational investments
into four different measures weighted by migration, to more accurately measure the
educational investments of each state. Doing this allows the benefits from educational
investments to be identified as a result from one’s own state investment or from an-
other state’s investment. Results of Chapter 4 suggest that educational investment
spillovers do exist between states. In fact, at the mean, educational spending per
pupil increases of $1,000 in one state imply a 0.12% increase in earnings growth in
any other state. Overall, the results also indicate that the total lifetime net earnings
associated with educational spending are less than the total cost.
In Chapter 5, I use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from
2001-2014. This dataset includes similar K-12 education characteristics as well as
individual’s income, educational attainment, and other demographic characteristics.
The main driving force behind the extension of Chapter 5 is that by using individual
level data, I am able to narrow the focus of estimation on a younger generation of in-
dividuals to more strongly promote the connection between educational spending and
future earnings. Again, integrating migration into estimation allows me to separate
the effects of in-state educational investment and out-of-state educational investment.
Results of this chapter support the results of Chapter 4 in that educational invest-
ment spillovers exist between states. At the mean, out-of-state educational spending
per pupil increases of $1,000 imply a 0.20% increase in earnings within the state.
Again, overall results show that the total lifetime net earnings from this educational
spending are less than the total cost.
7
Through both of these detailed analyses, a more accurate estimation of the exis-
tence of educational investment spillovers across state borders is found. The findings
of this dissertation suggest potential policy implications surrounding educational in-
vestment decisions as well as policies that could affect migration between states. From
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, results suggest that educational spending may be crowding
out other potential investments that have a more prominent effect on future earn-
ings. This suggests that society may benefit from a decrease in educational spending
if this in turn increases other investments which largely and positively affect future
earnings. In addition, as Chapter 5 further supports the results of Chapter 4, we see
how large educational investment spillovers can be. The results of Chapter 5 also
indicate that potential policies promoting entry into or exit out of the state could
have major impacts on future earnings. Through both of these empirical estimations,
when choosing an optimal level of educational spending, it is important to take into
account the spillover effects of this spending due to labor migration as well as how
this investment may be crowding out other private and public investments.
8
Chapter 2 Literature Review
While there exists a vast literature on the economics of education related to this
study, I focus on three areas of particular relevance: the literatures on educational
spillovers, returns to education, and efficiency and optimization in educational provi-
sion. By investing in individuals’ education, as a society, we are not only promoting a
better future for each individual, but also for society as a whole. Understanding these
private returns as well as the public returns (or spillovers) to educational investments
is an important first step to my investigation. Although investing in education is
an essential task, it is also important to realize that it is harmful to largely over-
or under-invest in education. Taking a look at the literature on the optimization
of educational provision is the next step to my investigation. These three areas of
literature are significant to my study not only because they provide background on
the topic, but also because looking at them together reveals a hole in the literature
that I intend to fill. This section helps to clarify my contribution to the literature.
2.1 Spillovers from Education
Because the literature focused on the evidence of spillovers from education is still
young, there is a relatively small body of literature to examine. What is known,
is the central idea that while many private returns from education exist, education
also generates benefits beyond the individual. For example, Kenkel (1991), Lochner
(2011), and Wheeler (2007) find that higher education can lead people to live in ways
that contribute more to public health. In addition, increased education has been
found to promote civic activity and good governance (Dee, 2004; Glaeser and Saks,
2006; Milligan et al., 2004), as well as lower crime rates (Deming, 2011; Lochner, 2011;
Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Additional studies also indicate that increased education
9
can lead to higher productivity and wages for other workers (Moretti, 2004; Lucas,
1988).
At this point, a closer look at some of the studies that examine educational
spillovers on wages across borders and across people is necessary. Case et al. (1993)
expose channels in which educational expenditures can affect those across state bor-
ders using state-level data spanning 1970-1985. Although Case et al. mainly focus
on expenditure reaction functions, the authors offer reasoning behind the existence
of spillovers. Obviously those who receive education in one state and then move to
another state to work, create one route for investments in education to cross state
borders. In addition, well-educated workers in one state who received education there,
increase competition with workers in other states through firm outputs.
Moretti (2004) investigates the social returns to higher education at the city level
by comparing wages of similar individuals living in areas with different shares of col-
lege educated workers in the labor force. OLS estimates show a positive relationship
between a city’s share of college graduates and wages, but testing potential biases
due to omitted variables is needed. Using data from the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youths (NLSY) for 1979-1994 and the 1980, 1990 Census, Moretti shows that
omitted individual and city-specific characteristics are not a major source of bias.
Moretti concludes that as the supply of college graduates increases in a city, wages
for high school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates increase. This
finding indicates that there is a spillover of benefits occurring between more educated
people and others around them. Moretti’s work advances past research such as Lu-
cas (1988) and Marshall (1890), that argue that positive externalities from education
may be generated across workers through the sharing of knowledge and skills. In ad-
dition, Romer (1986, 1992) also acknowledge that externalities from education may
exist when outputs from that education become public goods that spill over into the
economy.
10
While many studies find that education externalities exist, Moretti (2004) notes
that because the empirical literature is so young, there is little consensus on the size of
the education externality. In addition, Lange and Topel (2006) review cross-country
studies that use aggregate data and suggest that the evidence of educational external-
ities is inconclusive. The authors advise that empirical results do not always support
the significance of productivity externalities from education. In fact, through their
own spatial equilibrium model of local wage determination, they discuss a signaling
model of education in which the spillover effect from education is actually negative.
Through the investigations of this dissertation, I hope to fill the gaps within this lit-
erature and find more conclusive evidence about the existence and size of educational
externalities.
2.2 Returns to Education
2.2.1 Monetary Returns - Earnings
There is an extensive literature that focuses on the returns to education at the
individual level using micro-data. Card (1999) provides a summary of this literature
on individual returns to education. Card shows that simple modeled papers such as
Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Card (1995b) find 5% to 10% increases in yearly
earnings for each additional year of schooling. Card (1999) also discusses the more
intricate models in which the authors try to factor out characteristics that can be
correlated with schooling; for example, ability. Such papers including Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998) and Arias and McMahon (2001) offer estimates for the educational
returns to the individual using identical twins. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) use
identical twins surveyed between 1991 and 1993 to measure the returns to schooling
for the individual. They find that for the wage rates of twins, each additional year
of schooling leads to an average return of 9% for genetically identical individuals.
Using micro-data from 1967-1995, Arias and McMahon (2001) find slightly higher
11
average dynamic rates of return to total financial assets for college educated males
and females of 11.7%.
2.2.2 Non-Monetary Returns
The returns to education literature also expands passed just the market returns
to education. Although I do not measure any of these returns in this dissertation,
it is very important to recognize that these benefits exist. For example, Wolfe and
Haveman (2002) identify nonmarket returns to education such as intrafamily pro-
ductivity, marital choice efficiency, and health of children. In addition, there are
numerous publications that document that a child’s level of education and cognitive
ability is positively related to the education of the child’s parents.1 The education
of adults in a neighborhood has also been shown to increase the likelihood of a child
to graduate high school (Clark (1992), Duncan (1994), and Ginther et al. (2000)).
Dye (1980), Hodgkinson and Weitzman (1988), and Freeman (1997) also show that
increased schooling increases charitable giving of both time and money. Furthermore,
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) suggest that the relationship between increased ed-
ucation and higher life expectancy that they find, substantially raises the private
returns to education.
2.2.3 State and Regional Returns
While there is an extensive literature examining the relationship between edu-
cational attainment for individuals and their private labor market outcomes, there
is much less evidence on how educational spending within a state affects aggregate
economic factors. After all, the estimates for private returns to education may in fact
be underestimating the full returns to education if education exhibits characteristics
1There are too many papers offering this finding to list them all, but here are the most recent:
Lam and Duryea (1999) and Duniform et al. (2001).
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of a public good or generates positive externalities. For the investigation of Chapter
4, I focus on educational returns based on aggregate state measures.
Curs et al. (2011) investigates funding for higher education and how the level
of privatization in this education system affects U.S. state economic growth. Using
state-level data spanning from 1975-2005, the authors employ Arellano-Bond estima-
tion techniques that offer empirical guidance. To account for the fact that education
is an investment over many years, in their model, the authors use five year averages
of past education expenditures to measure the effect of this spending on per-capita
income growth. They find that states with large public shares of higher education
experience a positive relationship between funding and per-capita income growth.
In contrast, states with large shares of private higher education have a negative re-
lationship between funding and economic growth. Although their work is mainly
focused on higher education, the authors also find positive returns to K-12 education
expenditures on per-capita income growth.
Important to my study is Hanushek et al. (2015). This paper examines how school
quality is related to state income growth using newly-formed measures of human cap-
ital that focus on cognitive skills rather than years of schooling. Due to the high
mobility of U.S. residents, migration rates are incorporated into their human capital
measures that allow for a more accurate measure of the effects of educational achieve-
ment on incomes. By analyzing a range of feasible educational quality reforms, they
discover significant state-level economic returns. Using various standard deviation in-
creases in NAEP test scores of states, the authors find that these higher test scores of
future workers in the state positively promote economic growth. In addition, because
of the variation in test scores across states, states vary greatly in the benefits gained
from the education quality reforms examined.
Futhermore, Hanushek et al. (2015) describes how policies of one state could have
major implications for other states due to outmigration. If only one state chooses to
13
reform education, benefits to this state may be very low if the educated workers then
move to another state and take their higher quality education with them. However,
if all states reform in similar ways, then any educated worker who leaves the state in
which they were educated, would potentially be replaced by another equally educated
worker migrating from another state. The authors suggest that economic outcomes
vary dramatically by state depending on that particular state’s rate of outmigration.
In essence, the states with high rates of outmigration would suffer the most and could
subsequently lose the desire to invest more in education if they are not receiving much
benefit. Because of this finding, it is much more beneficial for all states to reform
education policies instead of just a few. Many states pushing for reform could motivate
federal policy in the future.
While there is a vast literature examining the relationship between educational at-
tainment for individuals and their labor market outcomes, there is much less evidence
on how educational investments within a state affect future aggregate employment
and earnings within that state as well as outside of that state, presumably due to
the existence of educational investment spillovers. Through my work in Chapter 4
and Chapter 5, I am able to fill this gap within the literature by estimating the fu-
ture benefits from educational investments through employment and earnings while
accounting for migration.
As Hanushek et al. (2015) points out, much of the previous education literature
does not provide a practical way of calculating the benefits from education and in fact
can distort both calculations of cost and benefits. Following these authors’ procedure,
I implement a similar birthplace matrix to more accurately measure state education
spending and student achievement. Through my investigation, I offer a more viable
way to calculate these economic benefits by incorporating birthplace rates as well as
present value discounting methods. By taking interstate migration into account, I
separate and identify the educational investment benefits due to in-state investment
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and benefits due to out-of-state investment.
2.3 Efficiency and Optimization in Educational Provision
The literature that examines the efficiency of public service provision offers base-
line techniques that I adapt to form my educational spending models and interpre-
tations. Examples of these studies include Brueckner (1979, 1982), Brueckner and
Fansler (1983), and Barrow and Rouse (2004), which help to motivate my investiga-
tion of whether educational spending is set at a level which maximizes future earnings
and employment. Brueckner (1979) develops a theoretical model and an estimating
equation involving a government budget constraint that together allow for the in-
spection of whether a public good is provided efficiently. Brueckner uses property
value determination along with a public good and property taxation of northeastern
New Jersey communities for this study. Brueckner’s theory supports the idea that
efficient levels of public goods are those that maximize property values. Brueckner
concludes that the communities in the study overprovide public goods and that a
reduction in the provision of these public goods would lead to an increase in the com-
munities’ property values. Brueckner’s approach rests upon the strong assumption
that all of the communities were “identically efficient or inefficient in providing the
public good”. Brueckner argues that this assumption is justified by the fact that if
communities were found to provide public goods inefficiently, all of the communities
would be likely to provide the good inefficiently in the same direction, that is, either
all communities would be overproviding the good or all communities underproviding
the good, due to parallels in governmental structure and political processes.
Brueckner (1982) follows the same research agenda of examining the efficiency of
public goods by using property value maximization for communities in Massachusetts.
In this paper, aggregate property values in a community resemble an inverted U-
shaped function of its public good output, which maximizes at the point in which
15
the output level reaches Pareto-efficiency. Because of the inverted U-shaped function
and by applying the same assumption as in the 1979 paper that communities exhibit
a common efficiency bias, Brueckner is again able to make efficiency interpretations
simply based upon the sign of the coefficient associated with the public good. If
the coefficient on the public good is positive, Brueckner interprets the public good
as being underprovided, and if the coefficient is negative, then the public good is
overprovided. Incorporating the same logic, if the aggregate property values in a
community are unresponsive to marginal changes in the public goods provided, that
is, if the coefficient is nearly zero, then this value indicates that the public good is
being provided efficiently. When investigating the efficiency of community educational
expenditures and non-education municipal expenditures in Massachusetts, Brueckner
finds neither of the associated coefficients to be significantly different from zero. Under
the assumption that a common efficiency bias exists, Brueckner suggests that these
results indicate the communities are neither systematically over- nor underproviding
the public goods.
In contrast to Brueckner (1979, 1982) and Brueckner and Fansler (1983), Barrow
and Rouse (2004) examines school expenditure efficiency by investigating whether
state aid for education maximizes property values. They find that school districts
do not overspend on education and state funding is valued by residents. Like the
previously discussed papers, if we assume that individuals choose where to live based
on preferences for education (or other publicly provided goods), then property values
should reflect the value of all benefits the individual associates with education invest-
ments. When publicly provided education investments increase and this provision of
education is positively valued by residents, then the property values would increase,
and vice versa. Allowing for mobility permits the property values to capture all of
the perceived benefits from education. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship
between education expenditures (a public good) and earnings. While I investigate the
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potential of education investment to maximize future earnings (similar to maximizing
property values), it is important to make the distinction that I am only looking to
measure the earnings benefits from education rather than all benefits from education,
as the previous authors have done.
2.4 Extensions to the Literature
This dissertation builds upon and adds many dimensions to the existing education
literature. Combining the three areas of research discussed above reveals a hole in the
literature that my dissertation can fill. For example, the current literature addressing
spillovers from education is rather young and does not have strong, conclusive evi-
dence about the existence or magnitude of educational investment spillovers. Through
my empirical work of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I hope to provide a different perspec-
tive on the evidence for spillovers from education. In addition, much of the education
literature focuses on individual-level returns. Chapter 4 of this dissertation, however,
focuses on the aggregate state-level returns to educational investment. Furthermore,
one of the largest contributions of my dissertation is the modeling and calculation of
the impacts of educational investment. By integrating interstate migration into my
estimation, I am able to separate the effects from in-state educational investments
and from out-of-state educational investments, thereby identifying the spillovers from
investments in education.
17
Chapter 3 A Model of Intertemporal Educational Spillovers
To study the implications of education, analyzing its effect on earnings and em-
ployment through a theoretical model is necessary. To determine the relationship
between education and labor market outcomes, I follow Harden and Hoyt (2003) ex-
amination of how balanced-budget changes in the tax structure affect labor markets
allowing for firm and labor mobility. In this model, integrating migration across state
borders is a vital step as I estimate educational investment spillovers. For without
introducing the concept of migration between states into this model, estimation of
educational spillovers across borders would not be possible.
3.1 Maximizing Net Earnings
Here, I develop a theoretical model in which education investments are associated
with future earnings and employment benefits. More specifically, this model estab-
lishes the relationship between education spending and earnings such that education
is chosen to maximize future aggregate earnings net of educational expenditures (net
earnings). As discussed in Chapter 2, there are numerous benefits associated with in-
vestments in education, both monetary and non-monetary. To keep my model simple,
I do not account for every benefit from education. If I were to include all benefits, the
goal of my model would be to choose the level of education investment that maximizes
net benefits from education. In this sense, the net benefits from education would in-
clude all benefits and all costs associated with education. While this would provide a
great perspective on the cost and benefits of education, many of these aspects do not
hold a numerical value. Because of this, including all of the benefits from education
in my model would be very difficult. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that
I am only focusing on earnings and employment benefits in this dissertation, so my
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results are in terms of net earnings (NE), rather than net benefits (NB). As you will
see in the model below, I only include earnings benefits (in the form of wages) as a
future benefit from education investment.
I model the government’s problem of maximizing future social welfare (net earn-
ings), of its constituents by choosing current education and taxes. Consider a simple
two-period model in a balanced-budget framework. First, the level of education in a
state is chosen to maximize the net income of the current generation (t=0) and the
discounted income of their children, −EA0 . This term represents the loss in wages due
to taxes because of the balanced-budget framework (EA0 = TA0 ). No wages are shown
for time t=0 as these wages are already determined and have no effect on this model.
Then, let there be two states, A and B. State A is only concerned about the wages
of those working in state A: (wA). Because of migration, however, the wages in state
A not only depend on those educated in state A, but also on those educated in state B
and the mix of workers from both states. In equation form: wA = L
BA
1
LAA1
wAA + L
AA
1
LAA1
wBA
where wAA is the wage of workers in state A educated in state A, wBA is the wage of
workers in state A educated in state B, and the fractions containing L act as weights
for migration. Taking one step further, wAA is a function of the education of state A
and of state B as: wAA1 (EA0 , EB0 ×
LBA1
LAA1
) where L
BA
1
LAA1
weights EB0 for migration of those
from state B to state A. Given this, the second term of the wAA function accounts
for spillovers between states.
Then, putting these concepts together, the problem in state A at time 0 is:
max
EA0
NEA = −EA0 NA +β
[
LAA1 w
AA
1
(
EA0 , E
B
0 ×
LBA1
LAA1
)
+ LBA1 wBA1
(
EB0 , E
A
0 ×
LAA1
LBA1
)]
(3.1)
where Eit is the level of educational expenditures per pupil in state i in year t, NA
is the number of students receiving education in state A, β is the discount rate, Lijt
is the number of workers educated in state i working in state j at time t, wAA1 is the
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wage of workers educated in state A working in state A at time 1, and wBA1 is the
wage of workers educated in state B working in state A at time 1.1
The first order condition with respect to EA0 is then:
−1 + β
(
LAA1
NA
∂wAA1
∂EA0
+ L
BA
1
NA
∂wBA1
∂EA0
× L
AA
1
LBA1
)
= 0 (3.2)
Upon expanding the above equations to include those who were educated in state B,
we have a social net earnings (SNE) function which includes education expenditures
and earnings benefits for both states:
max
EA0
SNE =
[
−EA0 NA + β
[
LAA1 w
AA
1
(
EA0 , E
B
0 ×
LBA1
LAA1
)
+ LBA1 wBA1
(
EB0 , E
A
0 ×
LAA1
LBA1
)]]
+
[
−EB0 NB + β
[
LBB1 w
BB
1
(
EB0 , E
A
0 ×
LAB1
LBB1
)
+ LAB1 wAB1
(
EA0 , E
B
0 ×
LBB1
LAB1
)]]
(3.3)
Then, the socially optimal investment in education satisfies the condition:
−1 + β
L
AA
1
NA
∂wAA1
∂EA0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ L
BA
1
NA
∂wBA1
∂EA0
× L
AA
1
LBA1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ L
BB
1
NB
∂wBB1
∂EB0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
+ L
AB
1
NB
∂wAB1
∂EB0
× L
BB
1
LAB1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
 = 0
(3.4)
where the residents in state A ignore any impact that education of their children have
on the wages earned by those working in either state A or B who, as children, received
their education in state B. This relationship can be seen through the fact that terms
(a) and (b) of the above equation are independent of terms (c) and (d). Examining
Equations (3.2) and (3.4), we see that state A is only concerned about state A’s
net earnings and not the social net earnings. Also, the expenditures and number of
students of state B do not have an affect on state A’s net earnings. Terms (a) and
1Additional information of the model setup can be found in Appendix A.
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(b) of Equation (3.4) zero out given the relationship of Equation (3.2). This leaves
only terms (c) and (d) of the social net earnings function and these terms are what
I consider the externality (or marginal external benefit) occurring from educational
investment:
MEB =
(
LBB1
NB
∂wBB1
∂EB0
+ L
AB
1
NB
∂wAB1
∂EB0
× L
BB
1
LAB1
)
(3.5)
Finally, the impact of education in one state on labor earnings is estimated by:
LAA1
NA
∂wAA1
∂EA0
+ L
BA
1
NA
∂wBA1
∂EA0
× L
AA
1
LBA1
(3.6)
where only earnings of those working in the state matter. Now, the equation for the
relationship between wages, birthplace, and education has been derived. From this
equation, I can separate the benefits due to in-state investment as well as out-of-state
investment and identify the spillover from educational investments. Below, I illustrate
this theoretical model and explain how I will use this model in conjunction with my
empirical model to estimate the returns to education in a state.
Using this framework, I estimate the lifetime earnings returns of these educational
investments. Using Brueckner (1982) as a guide, if the effect from education on earn-
ings and employment is positive, the government could be underproviding education
in respect to future earnings and employment. In Figure 3.1 below, I illustrate the re-
lationship between educational spending and earnings, assuming diminishing returns
to education. Also illustrated, when a positive coefficient is estimated, we think of the
level of education provided by the government as being in the positively sloped area
of the quadratic function. Adapting the work of Brueckner, being in this area would
indicate that the level of education is below the maximizing level of education because
this coefficient represents the partial derivative, or slope, of this relationship. Using
the same logic, if the effect is a negative value, the government could be overproviding
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education in respect to future earnings and employment. Last, if the coefficient is
approximately zero, the government may be choosing a level of education in which
earnings benefits are equal to the cost. In the figure below, the downward sloping
wage function, W1(T ), represents how wages decrease to offset an increase in taxes
or how employment would decrease with an increase in taxes, as education is held
constant. The two wage functions which are upward sloping show how education has
diminishing marginal returns. The lower upward sloping curve, W1(EA), represents
how the wages or employment of state A respond to the education provided by state
A. The other upward sloping curve, W1(EA, EB), illustrates state A’s earnings or em-
ployment levels of the current labor force who were educated in state A or educated
in state B. Then, at the point where the quadratic function is maximized, the slopes
of the two wage functions are opposite in sign, but equal in magnitude, as shown by
Figure 3.1 below. The summation of these two slopes equal zero, as formulated by
the theoretical modeling of Equation (3.2).
Figure 3.1: Educational Returns
My predictions of this model are that the sign associated with educational spend-
ing is positive, indicating that there is an underprovision of educational investment in
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terms of maximizing future earnings and employment. In addition, I predict that the
future lifetime earnings returns to these educational investments will outweigh the
total costs of education. After all, we invest in education in order to promote future
success and if this success is less than the cost of investing, why would we invest in
the first place.
23
Chapter 4 Educational Investment On Earnings and Employment:
State-level Analysis
In this chapter, the impacts on labor market outcomes associated with state-
level educational investments are examined through aggregate future earnings1 and
employment. This chapter, specifically, evaluates the existence of educational invest-
ment spillovers on labor market outcomes across state borders. While education is
provided and primarily funded at the state and local levels, extensive migration makes
it likely that states that benefit from the education of their workforce are not the same
as the states that fund this education. Examination at the aggregate state level allows
for the inclusion of educational externalities affecting overall productivity (Moretti,
2004) and offers evidence about whether states appear to be providing education at
levels consistent with maximizing future employment and earnings. My strategy in-
volves disaggregating educational investments into four different measures weighted
by migration, to more accurately measure the educational investments of each state.
Doing this allows the benefits from educational investments to be identified as a result
from one’s own state investment or from another state’s investment.
My results suggest that educational investment spillovers do exist between states.
In fact, results show that at the mean, educational spending per pupil increases of
$1,000 in one state imply a 0.12% increase in earnings growth in any other state.
Overall, the results also indicate that the total lifetime benefits associated with edu-
cational spending are less than the total cost. One major takeaway from this chapter
is that it is easy to see that educational investments of one state do impact future
labor market outcomes of other states.
1In this paper, earnings refer to earnings per employed persons.
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The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 is estimated here by using a 43-year
panel from 1972-2014 of state-level data including measures of education achievement
(lagged 8th grade NAEP math test scores) and (lagged) educational spending to
investigate the impact of education on the growth of earnings and employment in
states. My empirical approach follows a first differenced dynamic panel data model
and the results of this estimation provide a clearer view of the impact of education
provided within a state on that state’s economic performance as well as the economic
performance across state borders. The high degree of interstate mobility of U.S.
residents necessitates a measure to account for those in the state workforce who
did not receive their education there. Using state of birth as a proxy for where
K-12 education was received, I implement a birthplace-weighted matrix that allows
educational investments to be more accurately measured.
My research differs from previous studies in various ways. The main focus of this
chapter is to identify educational investment spillovers on labor market outcomes
across state borders. To do this, I use public K-12 educational spending and 8th
grade NAEP test scores as my educational investment measures and earnings growth
and employment growth as my labor market outcomes. My data spans from 1972
to 2014, which is a longer and more recent timeframe for state-level data compared
to other studies. Spillovers from investments in education are shown to exist and by
using state-level data, I am able to account for school district spillovers as a whole.
I am also able to capture and quantify the effect of spillovers across state lines. My
research continues to differ from past studies in that not only am I examining the
impact of educational investment on earnings and employment growth, but I am also
using a balanced-budget framework which allows me to compare the total cost of
education to the investments devoted to education and the resulting future lifetime
earnings benefits.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 includes a
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description of the state-level data and Section 4.2 explains my empirical methodology,
while Section 4.3 discusses my results. Finally, Section 4.4 addresses caveats, discusses
contributions, offers extensions for future work, and concludes.
4.1 Data
To examine the effects of education on employment and earnings, I employ a 43-
year panel from 1972-2014 of state-level data for the 50 U.S. states.2 This panel in-
cludes publicly available data from various sources measuring incomes, expenditures,
and K-12 education characteristics. From the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), I obtain my two primary variables of interest, annual earnings by place of
work3 and the annual employment level, as well as total annual state population.4
Following Curs et al. (2011), I also collect other types of state and local govern-
ment expenditures and industry shares of annual state GDP from the BEA. From
the U.S. Census Bureau, I collect labor force demographics (gender, race, educational
attainment). Public K-12 education data are obtained from the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES) and the Annual Digest of Education Statistics and
include state and local current expenditures per pupil and total enrollment levels
recorded at an annual frequency under the spring of the academic year.5 Total cur-
rent expenditures per pupil collected at the state level include all funds originating
from the federal, state, and local governments. To accurately capture state-to-state
spillovers in this analysis, I use only the state and local expenditures per student.6 I
2The District of Columbia is omitted due to missing data. For all states, "neighbors" are not
defined by state borders, but by migration of the population between states.
3Earnings are the sum of wages and salaries, supplements to wages and salaries, and proprietors’
income.
4I then calculate growth rates for earnings and employment using: (Yt − Yt−1/Yt−1)
5For example, academic year 1980-1981 is recorded under the year 1981.
6Federal revenues are subtracted from the total current expenditures per pupil, so expenditures
per pupil are only from state and local sources. Federal revenues are also collected from the NCES
and Annual Digest of Education Statistics.
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collect total higher educational funding and enrollment levels for public institutions
from the Annual Digest of Education Statistics and use this total to calculate higher
public education spending per student.7 I also calculate the college enrollment rate
by dividing the enrollment level by the state population. All data are adjusted for
inflation and expressed in 2015 dollars. Summary statistics of data values are shown
in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Because of the high degree of mobility of U.S residents among states, migration
rates must be accounted for when measuring educational investments. For example,
the workforce in the state of Kentucky is not only made up of individuals educated
there, but also those educated in any other state who then migrated to Kentucky.
For this reason, I use place of birth as a proxy to measure where a state resident
received their elementary and secondary education.8 Following the Hanushek et al.
(2015) weighted average migration matrix, I use a weighted average birthplace ma-
trix to measure the appropriate amount of education invested in each state’s current
workforce. Using 1970 Census IPUMS, this state-by-state migration matrix contains
birthplace totals for 1% of the 1970 population for each state.9 Doing this for the
entire U.S. allows me to more accurately weight the educational investment and ed-
ucational achievement of each state. Figure 4.1 below depicts the percentage of the
1970 population who were born in their current state of residence. A full list of state
percentages in 1970 as well as in 2010 can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Table 4.1 below illustrates what part of the migration matrix that I incorporate looks
like. For this table, I have chosen only the state of Kentucky and its bordering states.
In this table, the rows show the state in which the 1970 population lived and the
7Total higher education funding includes funding from Federal, State, and Local governments.
8This follows Card and Krueger (1992). In the United States, 86% of children aged 0-14 live in
their state of birth.
9Then for each state, I calculate the percentage born in each of the fifty states, DC, and foreign-
born.
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columns show the state in which the population was born. For example, at the in-
tersection of the column labeled Kentucky and row labeled Illinois, we see a value
of 0.92. This value indicates that 0.92% of the 1970 Illinois population was born in
Kentucky.
Figure 4.1: 1970 Population Born in Current State of Residence
Table 4.1: Migration Matrix for Kentucky and Bordering States
Kentucky Illinois Indiana Missouri Ohio Tennessee Virginia West Virginia
Kentucky 84.57 1.12 1.64 0.45 2.50 2.03 0.58 0.80
Illinois 0.92 77.85 1.60 1.83 0.88 1.05 0.25 0.26
Indiana 5.33 4.02 75.04 0.67 2.35 1.67 0.42 0.46
Missouri 0.54 3.46 0.64 76.07 0.58 0.92 0.18 0.16
Ohio 3.84 0.88 1.26 0.31 76.03 1.07 0.73 3.35
Tennessee 1.80 0.87 0.49 0.55 0.61 79.17 1.59 0.29
Virginia 0.78 0.83 0.43 0.41 1.10 0.95 68.84 2.59
West Virginia 1.48 0.30 0.24 0.05 2.91 0.27 2.54 85.05
Using this birthplace rate matrix in different weighting calculations gives me four
different measures of educational investment to be used in estimation. These different
measurements are weighted for interstate migration in the following ways: unweighted
for migration (known as own investment from this point forward), weighted-average
based on migration, in-state weighted by only those who were educated and now work
in the same state, and out-of-state weighted by migration of those who were educated
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in a state other than where they now work. Shown below are the calculations for the
educational investment measures weighted by migration where fji is the percent of
the population who were born in state j and now live and work in state i and Ej is
the educational investment of state j.
Own Education (OE): Own Education measures educational investment that is un-
weighted for migration. That is, this variable includes the data straight from the
publicly available data source.
OEi = Ei (4.1)
Weighted Average Education (AE): Weighted Average Education measures the stan-
dard calculation for weighted-averages applied to educational investment and weight-
ing by migration.
AEi = Σ50j=1fjiEj (4.2)
In-State Education (IE): In-State Education measures only those educational invest-
ments that occur within the state that future labor markets outcomes are being
estimated.
IEi = fjiEj, i = j (4.3)
Out-of-State Education (TE): Out-of-State Education measures only those educa-
tional investments that occur outside of the state that future labor market outcomes
are being estimated.
TEi = Σ49j=1fjiEj, i 6= j (4.4)
By applying the four different variations of educational investments in estimation,
I am able to identify the separate labor market benefits due to in-state educational
investment and out-of-state investments.
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4.1.1 Trends in Data
To evaluate the impacts of educational investment on future earnings, it is im-
portant to note the trends in educational spending as well as earnings. Figure 4.2
below illustrates the relationship between the log of earnings and different lags of ed-
ucational spending for years of data. Across all lag options the relationship between
earnings and education expenditures appears to be positive.
Figure 4.2: Earnings and Lagged Education Expenditures
To give some perspective of the differences in K-12 educational spending and
earnings across states, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 below map earnings and spending
patterns across states. All values are shown in 2015 dollars. Earnings for years
1976 and 2011 are shown below in Figure 4.3. Although many states’ earnings level
change, some states are consistently at the higher end of the earnings spectrum, such
as California and New York, while other states are consistently at the lower end, such
as Mississippi and Alabama.
Educational spending per pupil in years 1976, 1996, 2006, and 2011 are shown in
Figure 4.4 below. The maps show areas with consistently high educational spending
in states such as Wyoming and multiple Northeastern states. The maps also show
areas of consistently low educational spending in states such as Utah, Arkansas, Mis-
sissippi, and Tennessee. It is important to notice that just because a state has lower
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Figure 4.3: Earnings (of labor force)
earnings than another state, does not mean that the state spends less on educational
expenditures, and vice versa.
Figure 4.4: Educational Spending Per Pupil
4.2 Empirical Methodology
Rather than simply focus on quantifying the impact of education on earnings, I
also determine if, in fact, the level of educational investment chosen in a state is set
so that the future lifetime earnings of these investments are greater than the cost.
By integrating migration data for each state’s population, I also evaluate whether
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these educational investments extend passed state borders and influence the future
earnings of the people there. The relationship between earnings and employment and
educational investments is estimated by a dynamic panel data model:
Yit = θYit−1 + α1Eit−10 + α2E2it−10 + η1Eit−10 ×HSit−10 + η2Eit−10 × SCit−10
+η3Eit−10 × Cit−10 + βXit + γi + µt + υit
(4.5)
where Yit is earnings growth, Yit−1 is earnings growth lagged one year, Eit−10
is educational investment lagged ten years, E2it−10 is the square of educational in-
vestment lagged ten years, Eit−10 × HSit−10 is an interaction term for educational
spending and the percent of the population with a high school diploma lagged ten
years, Eit−10×SCit−10 is an interaction term for educational spending and the percent
of the population with some college (1-3 years) lagged ten years, Eit−10×Cit−10 is an
interaction term for educational spending and the percent of the population with a
college degree (4+ years) lagged ten years, Xit is a vector containing other state-level
variables and controls such as other types of government expenditures and industry
shares of annual state GDP, γi are state fixed effects, and µt are year fixed effects.10
The educational investments used in the model above include cognitive measures of
student achievement through 8th grade NAEP math test scores and the level of edu-
cational spending per pupil. The educational attainment variables used here act as a
proxy for parent’s educational background. Using these attainment values interacted
with spending allows me to observe the effect of education spending on earnings while
holding parents’ education constant. The different migration weights for educational
investment, own, average-weighted, in-state, and out-of-state, are incorporated across
10The covariates were chosen because they are potential factors that affect the productivity of
labor in addition to the level of education. Variables focusing on the determination of education
spending were left out.
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different specifications and substituted in for all E ′s in the above equation.
When estimating this baseline model, I instrument using Arellano Bond techniques
as done by Curs et al. (2011):
∆Yit = θ∆Yit−1 + α1∆Eit−10 + α2∆E2it−10 + η1∆Eit−10 ×HSit−10
+η2∆Eit−10 × SCit−10 + η3∆Eit−10 × Cit−10 + β∆Xit + ∆µt + ∆υit
(4.6)
I estimate this model with two-step system GMM. and by following this procedure,
I obtain efficient estimates (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). By
implementing a dynamic panel data model in first differences, I mitigate issues of
unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation while avoiding inconsistent estimates
due to estimating a model with both a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects
(Baum, 2006). The use of the ten-year lag on educational investment was selected
based on both theory and through inspection of the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) for multiple lag options. Theory suggests that because investments, such as
those in education, can take many years to impact economic factors and because
current educational investments might only affect those who are currently in school,
values of educational investment should be lagged a significant number of years in this
model.11 When examining multiple year lag options, the ten-year lag on educational
investment minimized the value of the BIC compared to other lags between one year
and fifteen years.12 For this earnings regression, the difference in values of the BIC
with the ten-year lag versus other year lags shows some evidence to use the ten-year
lag for educational investment. However, theory and data concerns mostly drive the
use of a ten-year lag for this investigation.
The baseline empirical model, (4.5), is modified to capture the educational invest-
11In the Curs et al. (2011) income growth regression, the average of the previous five years of
higher education expenditures is used to account for this investment over many years.
12Schwarz et al. (1978) introduced the BIC to be used with descriptive models in comparison to
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) which is used for predictive models.
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ment effects on state employment as:
Mit = θMit−1 + α1Eit−10 + α2E2it−10 + η1Eit−10 ×HSit−10 + η2Eit−10 × SCit−10
+η3Eit−10 × Cit−10 + βXit + γi + µt + υit
(4.7)
where Mit is total employment growth, Mit−1 is total employment growth lagged one
year, and all other variables are defined as above in Equation (4.5). When empirically
solving this model, I use the same procedure as above in Equations (4.5) and (4.6).
4.3 Results
Results from my preferred specifications for estimating the impact of educational
spending on earnings growth are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. The four
different weighted measures of educational spending are included in this table. Across
specifications, the variables own spending, average-weighted spending and in-state-
weighted spending all enter the regression linearly, squared, and interacted with the
percent of the population with varying educational achievements. Table 4.2 below
illustrates the coefficient results for my variables of interest. In this table, six different
specifications are shown depending on what migration-weighted educational spend-
ing is used for estimation and whether that educational spending is interacted with
educational attainment. As seen in Table 4.2, interactions with college (4+ years) are
negative across all specifications and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level,
while the interactions with high school and some college (1-3 years) are positive across
all specifications and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, depending on
the specification.
The negative coefficient on all of the interaction terms between educational spend-
ing and college may seem unexpected, however, I offer one possible explanation for
this finding. Remember, this interaction shows how the relationship between educa-
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tional spending and future earnings varies based on the highest level of educational
attainment achieved by each state’s population. The variable college measures the
percentage of a state’s population that has completed 4 or more years of college. Be-
ing that this interaction term is negative could indicate that as more of the state’s
population completes college, past K-12 educational spending has a smaller effect on
future earnings. This could be the case because if more of the state’s population is
educated well beyond high school, the effect on future earnings from K-12 education
is probably much smaller than other factors such as college education and worker-
to-worker spillovers. This explanation also aligns with the fact that the interaction
terms on high school diploma and some college are positive. When the percentage of
the population with these lower educational achievement levels is higher, education
from K-12 is much more important and probably plays a more significant role on the
future earnings of these individuals.
Table 4.2 also provides results for a more straightforward regression with no inter-
action terms. One change to notice is that my variables of interest have all dropped in
significance and magnitude. The linear and squared terms of all educational spending
measures are now statistically insignificant and nearly zero. Taking out the interac-
tion terms between educational spending and educational attainment clearly affects
this part of the model. Interpretation of the effects of educational attainment on
earnings growth involves examination of the marginal effects of each variable because
the percent of the population with a high school diploma, some college, and college
degree appear multiple times in the regressions. It is important to note that the
marginal effects of all educational attainment variables are relatively the same, al-
though slightly smaller, compared to my preferred specification. From both of these
models, the marginal effects of a high school diploma and some college are negative,
while the marginal effect of college is positive. These marginal effects are what we
would expect to see in that the marginal effects become larger in magnitude and more
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positive with an increase in the level of education achieved. For example, the marginal
effect of college for average-weighted educational spending has a value of 0.148 (from
specification (2)) and 0.088 (from specification (5)), indicating that as the percentage
of the population with at least 4 years of college increases, future earnings increase as
well. To be more specific, as the percentage of the population with a college degree
increase by 1 percentage point, future earnings increase by .15% and .09%.
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Table 4.2: Educational Spending on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 (OE)
OEt−10 −0.007 0.001
OE2t−10 −0.000
OEt−10 × HS 0.009
OEt−10 × Some College 0.023∗∗
OEt−10 × College −0.037∗∗
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 (AE)
AEt−10 −0.008∗ 0.001
AE2t−10 −0.000
AEt−10 × HS 0.013∗
AEt−10 × Some College 0.020∗
AEt−10 × College −0.031∗
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10(IE)
IEt−10 −0.005 −0.000
IE2t−10 −0.000
IEt−10 × HS 0.009
IEt−10 × Some College 0.020∗
IEt−10 × College −0.032∗∗
Out-of-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10(TE)
TEt−10 0.004 0.004
TE2t−10 −0.002 −0.002
High School Diplomat−10 −0.062∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.039∗∗
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗ −0.131∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.056∗∗
College (4+ years)t−10 0.280∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
Note: Full regression results are shown in the Appendix, Table 7 and Table 8. The squares of Own Education Spending,
Average-weighted Education Spending, and In-state weighted Education Spending for specifications (1)-(3) are not shown here
because coefficients are zero. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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4.3.1 Calculation of Lifetime Benefits vs. Cost
Because educational spending appears multiple times in my preferred specification,
to correctly evaluate the impact of educational spending on earnings growth I first
calculate the total differential at the mean:
dY
dEi
= α1 + (2α2 ∗ Et−10) + η1HSt−10 + η2SCt−10 + η3Ct−10 (4.8)
I then calculate the earnings benefits for each specification and state by multiplying
the total differential by the mean of earnings of each state:
B = dY
dEi
× Yi (4.9)
At the mean, educational spending per pupil increases of $1,000 in one state imply
a 0.12% increase in earnings growth in any other state. In terms of earnings, this
cost of $1,000 of one state implies a future earnings benefit of $58 in another state.
Examining the values of in-state benefits and out-of-state benefits for each state
shows an interesting pattern. For all states, the in-state education spending impact
on earnings is negative, while for most states, the out-of-state impact on earnings is
positive. In addition, for a number of states, these values are similar in magnitude,
but opposite in sign. However, testing the significance of the differentials used to
calculate the impact on earnings, indicates that they are not statistically different
from zero.
To determine the benefits of this educational spending in terms of future lifetime
earnings, this value is then discounted for 40 years. Proper discounting is done using
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a 3% discount rate, as is standard.13
1 +
( 1
1 + .03
)
+
( 1
1 + .03
)2
+ ...+
( 1
1 + .03
)40
= 24.11477 (4.10)
Present Value of Benefits = B × 24.11477
This final value gives the appropriately discounted present value of the earnings
benefits from educational spending. Overall, the discounted future earnings benefits of
the in-state-weighted educational spending per additional $1,000 is -$3,024, while the
future earnings benefits associated with out-of-state-weighted educational spending
per additional $1,000 is $1,383.
Next, I determine if educational spending is set so that the future lifetime earnings
benefits are greater than the cost. Applying a $1,000 increase per pupil per year for
grades K-12 assumes that the total amount spent on education is $13,000 per pupil.
Then, due to using a ten-year lag on the education variables, this $13,000 needs to be
properly discounted for those 10 years. Again using a 3% discount rate, this $13,000
becomes $17,470 as the total education cost. Finally, to calculate the net earnings
benefit of education, this cost value is subtracted from the benefits previously found:
Present Value of Total Cost = 13, 000× (1.03)10 = 17, 470
Net Earnings = Earnings Benefit - Total Cost
Overall, the results indicate that the total lifetime earnings benefits associated
with educational spending are less than the total cost for every state. Figure 4.5
and Figure 4.6 below show these results broken down by state. Figure 4.5 illustrates
the net earnings for in-state-weighted educational spending evaluated at the mean.
Although the net earnings values vary, all states have a negative net earnings. These
13In their paper, Hanushek et al. (2015) use a 3% discount.
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negative net earnings indicate that the earnings benefits from educational spending
are smaller than the cost and that educational spending may be set at a level that is
too high.
Figure 4.5: In-State Educational Spending Net Earnings
Figure 4.6 shows the benefit from out-of-state-weighted educational spending eval-
uated at the mean for each state. In other words, this figure shows the spillover
received by each state. For example, from the graph below we can see that Alabama
receives just over $3,000 in benefit from the educational spending of all other states.
Finally, Figure 4.7 illustrates the total net earnings from educational spending for
each state. This total net earnings is found by adding the net earnings received from
in-state investment to the benefit received from out-of-state investment, relating back
to my theoretical model. Overall, when evaluated at the mean, the average total net
earnings from educational spending is -$19,136. This value indicates that most states
are setting educational spending levels too high in terms of future earnings growth.
Net earnings benefits evaluated at the 25th and 75th percentiles show similar results.
These results are included in the Appendix in Figure A.1 and A.2. In Table A.4 of
the Appendix, we also observe that the coefficients for K-12 enrollment and college
enrollment rate are negative and statistically insignificant for all specifications. Col-
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Figure 4.6: Spillover of Earnings Benefits from Out-of-State Educational Spending
lege expenditures per pupil, however, are negative and statistically significant at the
1% level.
Figure 4.7: Total Net Earnings from Educational Spending
Taking a look at the overall results, these outcomes may not be what we would
expect to see. However, these results may be indicating that people who are educated
in one state and then work in another are different than the people who are educated
in one state and then work in the same state. In Figure 4.5, we see a negative impact
on earnings from those who are educated and then work in the same state, but in
Figure 4.6, we see a mix of negative and positives impacts on earnings from those who
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are educated in one state and work in another. This may indicate that for the states
experiencing positive impacts from out-of-state investment, the people who move into
the state to work are somehow different than those who received education there. The
people moving into these states may also be different from those who move into the
states that are experiencing negative impacts from out-of-state investment.
If the government chooses the optimal level of educational spending, we would
not expect to see negative benefits from education as found in this investigation.
Another possible explanation for these unexpected negative results is the fact that
this educational spending my be crowding out private investment and other pub-
lic spending. My theoretical model suggests that as educational spending increases,
consumption spending decreases. However, it may be the case that increases in ed-
ucational spending cause a decrease in private and public investments such as those
in business, infrastructure, or the like. This suggests that I may be estimating an
equation in which the marginal effect on wages from educational spending is less than
other private or public investment, which gives the negative benefit from educational
spending found here.14
4.3.2 Educational Spending on Employment
Also in the Appendix, Table A.6 shows the results for educational spending on
employment growth. Unfortunately, the regression results from this estimation do
not provide much insight into the relationship between educational spending or edu-
cational achievement and employment growth. In this table, almost all variables are
statistically insignificant. However, the coefficients on the interaction terms of educa-
14Refer back to Chapter 3 for more details of the theoretical model. The following equation shows
the model I may in fact be estimating. P represents other private/public investment.
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= 0 (4.11)
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tional spending and the percent of the population white are negative and statistically
significant at the 5% and 1% level, depending on the specification. Testing of the
total differential of educational spending for all three specifications shows that it is
not statistically different from zero, and thus educational spending has no statistically
significant effect on employment growth. Also, examining the marginal effects of all
educational achievement levels shows that for this dataset, educational achievement
does not have a significant impact on employment growth.
4.3.3 NAEP Test Scores on Earnings and Employment
Table 4.3 below displays regression results for earnings growth and NAEP test
scores. For the own, average-weighted, and in-state-weighted NAEP test scores, the
effect on earnings growth is positive, although the coefficients are nearly zero and
some statistically insignificant. The coefficient on out-of-state-weighted NAEP test
scores is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, although the value is
nearly zero as well. These results are not all that surprising as many researchers such
as Ludwig and Miller (2005), Deming (2009), Jackson (2009), Chetty et al. (2011),
and Heckman et al. (2013) have found that 8th grade test scores are not the best
measure of learning abilities and may be unrelated to future earnings.
Again, to correctly interpret the effects of NAEP test scores and educational
achievement on earnings growth, examination of the marginal effects is necessary
because the variables enter the regression multiple times. Again, we see the marginal
effects of high school diploma and some college are negative and not statistically
significant, while the marginal effects of college are positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. For the average-weighted educational spending specification, the
marginal effect of college is 0.076 and implies that as the percent of the population
with a college degree increases by 1 percentage point, future earnings growth increases
by .076%. The negative and positive signs associated with these marginal effects
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match those of the regressions of educational spending on earnings, as previously
discussed. For all four weighted measures of the NAEP test scores, the total effect of
test scores is 0.0002. This value indicates that at the mean, as NAEP scores increase
by 1 point, future earnings growth increases by 0.02%. This is an encouraging finding
as the results show a positive outcome from an increase in test scores (and therefore
quality of education), which agrees with Hanushek et al. (2015) from Section 2.2.3.
From Table A.7 in the Appendix, we see the results of NAEP test scores on
employment growth. Calculation of the total differential of NAEP test scores and
testing whether it is statistically different than zero, finds that the total differential
is not different from zero and thus, NAEP test scores do not have a significant effect
on employment growth. Examination of the marginal effects of a high school diploma
shows that a high school diploma as the highest level of educational achievement
lowers employment growth, although this is only statistically significant for the in-
state-weighted NAEP test scores. Almost the opposite is true when looking at the
marginal effects of some college. These effects are positive across all specifications
but are only statistically significant for the own-NAEP and average-weighted NAEP
test scores. The effects of college are rather small in magnitude, vary in sign, and are
statistically insignificant. Overall, it appears that NAEP test scores are not a good
predictor of future employment growth.
4.3.4 Educational Spending and NAEP Test Scores on Earnings
Found in the Appendix, Table A.8 shows the results of an additional specification
in which I estimate educational spending and NAEP test scores together on earnings
growth. From this table, we again see the marginal effect of high school is negative (al-
though statistically insignificant), the marginal effect of some college is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level, and the marginal effect of college is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. On the encouraging side, these findings
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Table 4.3: NAEP Test Score on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Own NAEPt−10 0.001∗∗
Own NAEPt−10 × HS −0.003∗∗
Own NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.002∗∗
Own NAEPt−10 × College −0.003
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 0.001
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS −0.003
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.004∗∗∗
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × College −0.004∗∗
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 0.000
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS −0.001
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.000
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × College −0.001
Out-of-state-weighted NAEPt−10 −0.000∗∗
High School Diplomat−10 0.827∗∗ 0.694 0.097
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.627∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗ −0.018
College (4+ years)t−10 0.746∗ 1.289∗∗ 0.171∗
Note: Full regression results are shown in the Appendix, Table 9. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1.
are consistent with the results previously found in other specifications. Unfortunately,
these regression results do not provide much evidence for the relationship between
educational spending and earnings growth as all total marginal effects of educational
spending are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
4.4 Caveats, Contributions, and Extensions
There are three main caveats that warrant mention at this point. First, different
changes in state-level policies such as educational quality and achievement require-
ments could have various effects on state-level education. These policy changes will
be accounted for and addressed in the empirical estimations in the future. In addi-
tion, following the work of Hanushek et al. (1996), an investigation at disaggregated
levels of schooling data, for instance at the county or district level, would likely result
in more reliable estimates of the true impact of education and the presence of educa-
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tional investment spillovers on future earnings and employment. As found in Chapter
5, estimation employing micro-data is used to more accurately measure the effects
of education and the presence of educational spillovers. An additional extension to
this chapter includes more narrowly focusing on the size of educational investment
spillovers. Furthermore, while I investigate if education expenditures are set at op-
timal levels in order to maximize future earnings, I need to stress that I am only
examining benefits of education in terms of earnings and not taking into account all
of the other benefits from education. Because of this, while my results indicate that
the government may not be choosing an optimal level of education expenditure, if I
would estimate my model including every benefit from education, I may in fact see
that the level of education expenditure is optimal. My results are therefore some-
what ambiguous about whether education is set at an optimal level and left to the
discretion of the reader. For more discussion pertaining my results, look to Chapter
6, the conclusion on this dissertation.
This chapter adds to the literature because its main focus is educational invest-
ment spillovers rather than educational returns. Whereas existing literature focus on
human capital formation as the mechanism through which education affects the indi-
vidual, I turn my attention away from just the human capital or quality of education
aspect and focus on a variety of educational investment types. This focus allows for
investigation into whether these investments affect earnings and employment across
state borders. My theoretical predictions also allow me to empirically test whether
education investments are set so that the earnings benefits from education are greater
than the cost. The results of this chapter indicate that some state level educational
investments do spill over into other states’ labor market outcomes. Results from this
investigation are not only important to the literature but they are also important for
those who are setting policies in regards to education. If in fact the results found in
this study prove reliable, future policy setters will have other state’s labor markets to
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consider. It is important to note that a true evaluation of the financial investments
in education requires a “comprehensive assessment of all of the returns to school-
ing -market, nonmarket, and external/public goods effects” (Wolfe and Haveman,
2002). This statement motivates future work involving all aspects of any returns to
educational investments.
In conclusion of this chapter, it is important to see that the results of this state-
level investigation raised a few questions that are more complicated to answer at the
state level. Specifically, why is the total earnings benefit from educational investments
negative? Are residence who migrate to another state systematically or demographi-
cally different than those who do not move across state borders? Do residence living
near a state border or farther from the border impact labor markets differently? As
you will see in the next chapter, this investigation is extended into individual-level
data. This estimation taken down to the micro-data level offers some interesting
details and answers to questions raised by this state-level investigation.
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Chapter 5 Educational Investment Spillover Effects using Micro-Data
In the previous chapter, I use state-level data in order to examine the impact of
educational investments in public education on aggregate state labor markets, specif-
ically earnings and employment. Using data on K-12 educational spending, 8th grade
cognitive test scores, and educational demographics of a state’s labor force, I observe
the impact these state-level investments have on employment and earnings growth.
Taking interstate migration into account, I separate the benefits from educational
investment into benefits due to in-state investment and benefits due to out-of-state
investment. By doing so I identify whether or not educational investment spillovers
exist between states. Results from this investigation show that some state-level edu-
cational investments do spill over into other states’ labor market outcomes.
The results from Chapter 4 have sparked many new directions for research interests
in this topic. For example, the results in the previous chapter show that some states
experience a positive spillover while other states experience a negative spillover from
labor migration. This brings to question what is causing this difference between
states? Also, what is causing this negative spillover? Are the individuals who move
across state borders somehow different than the individuals who stay within the state?
In this chapter, I extend the estimation of Chapter 4 in hopes of answering some of
these questions.
For this chapter, I employ the same methodology as the previous chapter, how-
ever, here I use individual-level data rather than state-level data and focus on the
distinctions between individual workers. One reason for doing this is to provide a
stronger link between educational investments and future earnings and employment.
Using individual-level data allows me to narrow the age range of individuals used in
estimation to only those aged 24-28. This promotes a stronger connection between
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the 10-year lag on educational investments and future earnings because individuals
aged 24-28 years old now would have been 14-18 years old 10 years ago and would
have been in high school receiving the educational investments under investigation.
Examining the same research topic as Chapter 4, but now at the micro-data level
allows me to further support the results of the previous chapter by capturing a more
accurate picture of the spillovers occurring. Because I have individual level data, I
can more precisely see the amount of educational spending associated with each in-
dividual and their future earnings. Therefore, using individual-level data gives more
reliable estimates of the true impact of education and the presence of educational
investment spillovers on future earnings.
In this chapter, I use 14 years of individual-level data from 2001-2014. The ma-
jority of this data come from the American Community Survey (ACS), while supple-
mental state-level data come from various publicly available data sources as used in
Chapter 4. Individual-level data used here includes migration patterns, educational
attainment, income levels, and demographic characteristics for all individuals. State-
level data includes public K-12 educational spending, taxes per capita, and other
government expenditures. Evaluation of the relationship between educational invest-
ment and future earnings is estimated with a Heckman two-step selection model,
selecting on whether the individual has moved out of their state of birth.
Results from this micro-data estimation support the results in Chapter 4 in that
educational investment spillovers across state borders do occur and are statistically
significant. The results of this chapter suggest that as educational spending outside
of the state ten years ago increased by $1,000, future earnings inside the state in-
crease by 0.20% due to migration into the state. In terms of earnings, the cost of
$1,000 generates a $62.76 spillover of benefits. Again, we see that in-state educational
investments cause a negative impact on future earnings or private returns to those
educated and working within the state. Regression results indicate that as educa-
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tional spending within the state increases by $1,000, future earnings within the same
state decrease somewhere between 0.60% and 1.10%.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a de-
scription of the individual-level data, Section 5.2 explains my empirical methodology,
and Section 5.3 discusses my results. Finally, Section 5.4 discusses contributions,
offers extensions for future work, and concludes.
5.1 Data
To examine the effects of education on earnings, I employ a 14-year panel from
2001-2014 of individual-level data. This panel includes data from the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) and includes only individuals aged 24-28 years old to create a
stronger connection between lagged educational spending and future earnings. This
dataset includes demographic variables as well as migration patterns, educational
achievement, and income levels for all individuals.
This dataset also includes state-level variables such as public K-12 educational
spending, taxes per capita, and state own revenue as a percentage of GSP collected
from various public sources.1 As in Chapter 4, public K-12 education data are ob-
tained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and the Annual
Digest of Education Statistics and include state and local current expenditures per
pupil recorded at an annual frequency under the spring of the academic year.2 Total
current expenditures per pupil collected at the state level include all funds originating
from the federal, state, and local governments. To accurately capture state-to-state
1Unfortunately, educational spending data is not available at the individual, county, or puma
level, so assigning state-level data is the only currently available option. Taxes and revenues are also
only measured at the state level.
2For example, academic year 2001-2002 is recorded under the year 2002.
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spillovers in this analysis, I use only the state and local expenditures per student.3
Educational spending values are lagged 10 years and assigned at the state level as-
sociated with the individual’s state of birth.4 Because I assign educational spending
to each individual based on their state of birth, only individuals born in the U.S. are
used for this study. The other state-level control variables are identical to those in
Chapter 4 and are assigned to each individual based on the individual’s current state
of residence. These variables are measured at the state level because matching data
at the individual level is not available. Table 5.1 below provides a description of all
the variables used for estimation. All data are adjusted for inflation and expressed in
2015 dollars.5 Summary statistics of data values are shown below in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1: Variable Descriptions
Dependent Variable: i. Earnings
Variable of Interest: K-12 Public Educational Spending
Control Variables: Demographics Education Level
- Male - High school diploma, graduate, or GED
- White - Some college (1-3 years)
- Age - College graduate (4+ years)
- Military experience
- Child now present in home
- Ever married
- Disabled
Migration Other:
- Out of state - Moved across state line - Employed
- In state - Moved houses within same state - In the Labor force
- Taxes per Capita
- Agriculture as a % of GSP
- Manufacturing as a % of GSP
- Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSP
Notes: K-12 Public Educational Spending is measured at the per pupil level. Earnings here measures income earned from wages
or a person’s own business or farm.
Because of the high degree of mobility of U.S residents, accounting for migration
3Federal revenues are subtracted from the total current expenditures per pupil, so expenditures
per pupil are only from state and local sources. Federal revenues are also collected from the NCES
and Annual Digest of Education Statistics.
4I use state of birth as a proxy to measure where an individual received their elementary and
secondary education. This follows Card and Krueger (1992): In the United States, 86% of children
aged 0-14 live in their state of birth.
5IPUMS analysis suggests no need to use the Census Bureau’s adjustment factor for income
variables obtained from the ACS.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Income/Wages 30439.32 26059.65
Earnings 31382.78 26711.32
Log of Income/Wages 10.06 0.96
Log of Earnings 10.05 0.98
Employed 0.91 0.29
Education Spendingt−10 (1991-2005) 6.15 1.72
Male 0.51 0.50
Age 25.99 1.41
White 0.83 0.38
Ever Married 0.40 0.49
Disabled 0.04 0.20
Military Experience 0.06 0.23
Child Present 0.28 0.45
Currently in School 0.17 0.38
High School Graduate (diploma or GED) 0.21 0.41
Some College (1-3 years) 0.35 0.48
College (4+ years) 0.35 0.48
Out of State Move 0.32 0.47
Tax Per Capitat−2 2.26 0.62
State Own Revenue as a % of GSPt−10 0.12 0.02
Other government expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.12 0.03
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.01 0.01
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.13 0.05
Note: N=1,371,859 (Log of Earnings, N=1,289,926 due to negative and zero earnings in
this dataset). Statistics are from 2001-2014 and are expressed in 2015 dollars. This dataset
includes only individuals born in the U.S. Education Spending is measured in per pupil
terms and are measured in 1000s of dollars. Taxes Per Capita are also measured in 1000s
of dollars. The District of Columbia is omitted due to missing data.
becomes a very important step in determining whether educational investments cause
spillovers on earnings. For example, the workforce in the state of Kentucky is not only
made up of individuals who were educated there, but also those who were educated
in any other state and then migrated to Kentucky. To account for state-to-state
migration, I incorporate indicator variables to measure whether the individual has
moved out of their state of birth. Accounting for this cross-border move allows me to
identify the educational spillover that is occurring; that is, the out-of-state cost and
future earnings benefit of education. Also considering those individuals who moved
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within state or not at all allows me to identify in-state costs and future earnings
benefits of education. Summary statistics broken down by out-of-state-movers and
in-state/non-movers is below in Table 5.3. As shown in this table, individuals who
have moved out of the state in which they were born on average have higher earnings,
are more educated, and have a higher probability of having military experience, as
theory suggests.
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics - Based on Migration
Variable Non-Movers Out of State
Mean Movers Mean
Income/Wages 29163.36 33183.84
Earnings 30117.44 34104.48
Log of Income/Wages 10.02 10.13
Log of Earnings 10.02 10.13
Employed 0.90 0.92
Education Spendingt−10 (1991-2005) 6.13 6.21
Male 0.51 0.51
Age 25.97 26.05
White 0.82 0.85
Ever Married 0.39 0.43
Disabled 0.04 0.04
Military Experience 0.04 0.10
Child Present 0.29 0.25
Currently in School 0.16 0.19
High School Graduate (diploma or GED) 0.23 0.17
Some College (1-3 years) 0.36 0.33
College (4+ years) 0.31 0.44
Out of State Move 0 1
Tax Per Capitat−2 2.29 2.19
State Own Revenue as a % of GSPt−10 0.12 0.12
Other government expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.12 0.12
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.01 0.01
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.13 0.13
Note: Non-movers: N=936,481. Movers: N=435,378. Statistics are from 2001-2014 and are
expressed in 2015 dollars. This dataset includes only individuals born in the U.S. Education
Spending is measured in per pupil terms and are measured in 1000s of dollars. Taxes Per
Capita are also measured in 1000s of dollars. The District of Columbia is omitted due to
missing data.
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5.1.1 Trends in Data
For each of the 1,371,859 individuals used in this study, I see where they were
born, where they lived 1 year prior to the survey, and where they lived at the time of
the survey. In this dataset, 435,378 individuals now live in a different state compared
to where they were born. In addition, in the last year, 70,871 individuals moved
across state borders while 340,719 moved within state borders and 953,446 continue
to live in the same house. To evaluate the impacts of educational investment on
future earnings, it is important to note the trends in educational spending as well
as earnings. Figure 4.2 from Chapter 4 illustrates the relationship between earnings
and lagged educational spending. As the figure shows, across all lag options (1 year,
5 year, and 10 year) the relationship between earnings and education expenditure
is positive. For more details on the relationship between earnings and educational
spending, please review Section 4.1.1 of Chapter 4.
5.2 Empirical Methodology
In this chapter, my goal is to quantify the impact of lagged educational investment
on future earnings. More specifically, I aim to separately identify private returns
and public returns (or spillovers) to educational spending while using individual-
level data. With individual-level data on earnings and employment, it is common
to see individuals who report not being employed and thus having zero earnings.
Due to these survey responses, these individuals can be misspecified in estimation
and the true impact of educational spending on future earnings could be biased due
to selection by the individual to not work. In addition, with migration data being
incorporated for each individual, whether a person chooses to move out of their state of
birth or to remain in the state can also cause biased results. Because of this knowledge
about the data, modeling the relationship between educational spending and future
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earnings must be done carefully. Thereofore, I evaluate the relationship between
educational investment and future earnings using maximum likelihood estimation
with a Heckman two-step selection model as shown below:
log(Yijt) = β0+β1Ejt−10+β2E2jt−10+β3AEjt−10+β4Xijt+ρj+γi+µt+υit+εj+νjt (5.1)
where Yijt is earnings of the individual, Ejt−10 is educational investment lagged
ten years of the state in which the individual was born, E2jt−10 is the square of this
educational investment lagged ten years, AEjt−10 is the state-level weighted-average
educational spending from Chapter 4 assigned to the individual based on where they
currently live, Xijt is a vector containing other individual-level and state-level vari-
ables and controls such as demographic variables, other types of government expen-
ditures, and industry shares of annual state GDP, ρj are state fixed effects, γi are
individual fixed effects, and µt are year fixed effects.6 Modeling my estimation in this
way allows me to separate the impact of educational spending into private returns
and public returns or spillovers. From this estimation, β1 + β2 measures the private
returns to this educational spending and β3 quantifies the spillover effect from this
educational spending.
To simplify this estimation, I only include individuals in this sample who are
employed so that I can examine the relationship of passed educational spending and
future earnings. It is important to note that doing so could cause selection bias issues,
but for now these issues are being passed over.7
When implementing this Heckman selection model, I first determine the probably
6The covariates were chosen because they are potential factors that affect the productivity of
labor in addition to the level of education. Variables focusing on the determination of education
spending were left out.
7More details about this selection bias issue can be found at the end of this section.
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of being “observed" in the sample by selecting on whether the individual has moved
out of their state of birth. In this way, I am controlling for selection bias based on not
estimating those who have not moved out of their state of birth (outofstate=0). Then
I take this correction for selection and incorporate it into a regression estimating the
impact of educational spending on earnings.
In this estimation, I essentially ignore whether or not the individual is employed.8
Although the dataset includes individuals who work and who do not work, I only
keep those who work for this estimation. I realize this potentially causes econometric
issues that need to be addressed in the future, but this would most likely involve
a more complicated multinomial probit model. Because the option to work or not
work causes selection bias in this sample, I need to control for this bias to properly
estimate this relationship. Advancing this estimation technique is forthcoming.
5.3 Results
Results from my two-step Heckman selection model are displayed below in Table
5.4. Across all specifications in this table, we see that coefficient results are very
similar in magnitude and statistical significance.
Overall, lagged educational spending has a negative impact on future earnings for
those who receive education in one state and in the future work in the same state.
The linear term of educational spending for in the state where the individual received
education is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all specifica-
tions, whereas the squared term of educational spending is positive and then equal
to zero and statistically insignificant. To see the marginal effect of this educational
spending on an individual’s private returns in terms of earnings, for specifications
(1)-(3), the coefficient on the linear term of educational spending is sufficient. For
8In Appendix Section A.3.1 I estimate the probability of being employed. Results are shown in
Table A.9 of this section.
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example, in specification (3), we see a value of -0.006. This indicates that as the
educational spending increases by $1,000, future earnings decrease by 0.60%. For
specifications (4)-(5), the coefficients on the linear and squared terms, as well as the
interaction terms with educational attainment are needed to calculate the marginal
effect of educational spending. For specifications (4)-(5), the marginal effects are
approximately equal to -0.006 and -0.011, respectively. These values indicate that ed-
ucational spending increases of $1,000 decrease future earnings by 0.60% and 1.10%.
The total differentials calculated for all specification are statistically significant at the
1% level. Similar to the results of Chapter 4, we again see a negative relationship
between in-state educational spending and future earnings.
The spillover effect generated from educational spending is also shown in the
table below. Across all specifications, the coefficient on the lagged average-weighted
educational spending variable is positive and statistically significant. Magnitudes
across specifications are nearly identical for this variable as well. Interpretation of
this variable quantifies the effect of out-of-state educational spending. For example,
for specification (5), we see a value of 0.002 which is statistically significant at the
5% level. This indicates that as educational spending increases by $1,000 outside of
the state, earnings inside the state increase by 0.20% due to migration into the state.
Again, similar to the results of Chapter 4, we see a positive spillover effect on future
earnings from out-of-state educational spending.
From the table below we can also see that the coefficients associated with high
school graduate, some college, and college are all positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Examining the marginal effects of each level of educational attainment
results in very close values across specifications. It is encouraging to see that as
individuals increase their level of educational attainment, they also increase their
future earnings. For example, in specification (4), interpretation of the effect of
having a college degree indicates that those who have 4 years or more of college earn
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79.3% higher earnings than those with less than a high school diploma/GED.9
Table 5.4: Educational Spending on Earnings - Heckman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K-12 Educational Spendingt−10 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
K-12 Education Spending2t−10 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
AE Spendingt−10 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.008∗∗
(0.004)
Educational Spendingt−10 × SC 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
Educational Spendingt−10 × C 0.033∗∗∗
(0.003)
High School Graduate 0.280∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024)
Some College (1-3 years) 0.286∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
College (4+ years) 0.592∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024)
Inverse Mills ratio −0.528∗∗∗ −1.617∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Note: Total Observations: 1,245,788. Censored Observations: 844,008. Full regression
results are shown in the Appendix, Table A.8. AE Spending is average-weighted educational
spending from Chapter 4. In the variables Educational Spendingt−10 × SC and Educational
Spendingt−10 × C, SC indicates "some college" and C indicates "college". Standard errors
are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
9Because the variable college is included in both the outcome equation and selection equation,
the marginal effect is calculated a little differently than if it had only entered the outcome equation.
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5.3.1 Calculation of Lifetime Earnings Benefits vs. Costs
It is then possible to calculate the present value of benefits for the individual.10
To do so, the total differentials of in-state and out-of-state educational spending
evaluated at the mean are multiplied by the mean of earnings of individuals. We see
that the in-state education spending impact on earnings is negative and the out-of-
state impact on earnings is positive. For in-state educational spending increases of
$1,000 this gives a -$180.70 and -$331.28 impact on future earnings. For out-of-state
educational spending increases of $1,000 this gives a $60.23 impact on future earnings.
To determine the benefits of this educational spending in terms of future lifetime
earnings, this value is then discounted for 40 years. Proper discounting is done using a
3% discount rate, as is standard.11 This final value gives the appropriately discounted
present value of the earnings benefits from educational spending. Overall, the dis-
counted future earnings benefits of the in-state educational spending per additional
$1,000 is between -$4,357 and -$7,988, while the future earnings benefits associated
with out-of-state educational spending per additional $1,000 is $1,452.
Next, as done in Chapter 4, I determine if educational spending is set so that the
future lifetime earnings benefits are greater than the cost. Applying a $1,000 increase
per pupil per year for grades K-12 assumes that the total amount spent on education
is $13,000 per pupil. Then, due to using a ten-year lag on the education variables,
this $13,000 needs to be properly discounted for those 10 years. Again using a 3%
discount rate, this $13,000 becomes $17,470 as the total education cost. Finally, to
calculate the net benefit of education, this cost value is subtracted from the benefits
previously found. Doing so for the in-state educational spending results in negative
net benefits of -$20,487 and -$24,118, while the out-of-state educational spending
10Equations for a very similar procedure are shown in Chapter 4.
11Varied discount rate and found similar results. Hanushek et al. (2015) use a 3% discount rate.
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also results in negative net benefits although slightly smaller at -$14,678. Then, to
see the total social net benefit of future earnings, I add the in-state net benefits to
the out-of-state net benefits. This results in -$35,165 to -$38,796 in future earnings.
These results indicate that we may be overproviding educational spending.
Although these results may not be what we expect to find, the results still offer
some insight into this area of research. Similar to the results of Chapter 4, we see a
negative impact on earnings from those who are educated and then work in the same
state and we see a positive impact on earnings from those who are educated in one
state and work in another. As suggested in Chapter 4, because of this positive impact
from out-of-state movers, these individuals may be somehow different than those
individuals who do not move across state borders. As shown in the summary statistics
of Table 5.3, we know that movers earn higher earnings and are more educated. While
I cannot pinpoint why these individuals are more educated and earn higher earnings, I
can say that these individuals may be the driving factor behind this positive spillover
of benefits to future earnings.
5.4 Caveats, Contributions, and Extensions
There are a few ways that this chapter can be improved upon. As mentioned in
the empirical methodology section, this investigation may require a more sophisti-
cated estimation technique in order to avoid selection bias found in the variables that
measure whether an individual is employed and whether the individual has moved out
of their state of birth. Advanced methods for this estimation are currently being ex-
amined and are forthcoming. Regarding the data in estimation, educational spending
is assigned at the state-level rather than the individual, county, or puma levels. This
was necessary due to the data for educational spending not being available during the
timeframe of this analysis. Having this data would allow for an even more accurate
depiction of how educational spending affects future earnings across state borders.
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If/when this data becomes available, this change will be one of the first modifications
I make.
This chapter contributes to the literature because of its main focus on educational
investment spillovers across people and across state borders using individual-level
data. The results of this chapter indicate that state-level educational investments
impact future earnings across state borders due to labor migration. This suggests
that the results are not only important to the literature but also to policy makers.
As this chapter shows, educational investments chosen in one state impact the future
earnings of those in other states when individuals move across state lines. Being
aware of this impact, is therefore, very important when setting policies that could
encourage movement between states. The results of this chapter are also important
because the values here prove an assumption society has already made. Through
human interaction, we know individuals affect one another’s daily lives. Given these
results, it is important to understand that individuals can also impact the future
earnings and sucesses of everyone they interact with, especially those who move across
borders. Future extensions to this chapter include more precise estimation techniques
and data as mentioned above. In addition, examining policies that have affected
migration patterns in the past could offer interesting insights to the relationship
between educational spending and future earnings.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
The results of this dissertation indicate that the total net earnings from K-12
educational spending is negative. The estimation I offer here provides a different
perspective on how we see the benefits resulting from educational investment. While
some may be surprised by the negative results, there are many reasons behind this
negative finding.
Like I stated in the results and conclusion of Chapter 4, these negative net earnings
may simply be indicating that the government is overspending on education. While
we like to think that our government has our best interest in mind when setting edu-
cation policies, it is crucial to remember that our government is made up of different
parties with different political interests and goals. Because of this, it is possible that
educational spending is not always set at optimal levels. If education is overprovided,
a decrease in educational investment could lead to positive net earnings as described
by my theoretical model illustration. In addition, these negative results may be indi-
cating that public educational investments are crowding out other public and private
investments that more prominently affect future earnings benefits. Again, a decrease
in educational investment could result in positive net earnings if this decrease causes
an increase in other investments that positively affect future earnings.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that I do not account for the other
numerous benefits gained from investments in education. As mentioned in Chapter
2, increased education leads to many non-monetary benefits to society. These benefits
include better health, lower crime rates, and the promotion of civic activity, just to
name a few. Without including every benefit of education, it is impossible to know
for sure whether the benefits from the levels of education used in this dissertation are
greater than the cost of education. I leave it up to the reader’s discretion whether the
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numerous non-monetary benefits hold a value that outweigh the negative earnings
benefits found in this dissertation.
From the results found in this dissertation, one specific aspect stands clear in
support of policy implications: there are cross-border spillovers from education in-
vestment. This finding shows that each state’s policies regarding education influence
other states, especially when those in the population migrate to another state. This
relationship between states implies that a federal policy for education may promote
positive earnings benefits from education investment. Similar to Hanushek et al.
(2015), this dissertation supports education policies and reform that focus on all states
and their interrelationships rather than each individual state separately. Future work
on this topic would include a closer look at past policy changes and associated out-
comes as well as counterfactual federal policies regarding education investment and
quality. In addition, if data are available, investigating the existence of education
spillovers at the county/district level could provide interesting insight into whether
current state and local policies are the best option. While providing insights and a
different perspective on the benefits of education investment at the state and individ-
ual levels, the results of this dissertation strongly encourage future research in this
area.
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Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 3 Appendix
My theoretical model operates in a balanced-budget framework. For simplicity
purposes, I set EA0 = TA0 so that taxes are not shown in the equation. The model
starts with −EA0 . This term represents the loss in wages due to taxes. No wages are
shown for time 0 because these wages are already determined and do not have an effect
on this model. State A is only concerned about the wages of those working in state
A: (wA). Because of migration, the wages of state A include those educated in and
now working in state A as well as those who were educated in state B and now work
in State A: wA = L
BA
1
LAA1
wAA + L
AA
1
LAA1
wBA. wAA depends on the education of state A but
also the education of state B as shown in the theoretical model: wAA1 (EA0 , EB0 ×
LBA1
LAA1
)
in which L
BA
1
LAA1
is weighting EB0 for migration, and has a value less than 1. The second
term of the wAA1 function thus takes spillovers into account. The people educated in
B who then move to A could influence those people educated in A, thus having an
impact on the wages of those in state A.
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A.2 Chapter 4 Appendix
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Earnings Growth 0.01 0.02
Employment Growth 0.01 0.02
Own Education Spendingt−10 3.68 2.25
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 0.18 0.03
College Enrollment Ratet−10 0.05 0.01
College Exp.t−10 12.53 3.34
% of population born in current state of residence 0.72 0.13
Tax Per Capitat−2 1.63 0.89
Own NAEP test scoret−10 270.00 12.00
State Own revenue as a percentage of GSPt−10 0.12 0.03
Other government expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.12 0.03
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.02 0.02
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemporaneous) 0.15 0.07
% of Adults (25+ years) with a highschool diploma 0.32 0.04
% of Adults (25+ years) with some college (1-3 years) 0.22 0.07
% of Adults (25+ years) with college (4+ years) 0.32 0.05
Note: N=1,650. Statistics are for 50 states from 1982-2014 and are in 2015 dollars. Earn-
ings, Education Exp, College Exp, and Taxes are measured in per capita/per pupil terms.
Earnings are measured in dollars. Education Exp, College Exp, and Taxes are measured
in 1000s of dollars. Educational attainment values are measured as highest attainment
achieved.
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Table A.2: Percent of Population born in current state or residence, 1970 & 2010.
State % of 1970
population
born in
current
state of
residence
% of 2010
population
born in
current
state of
residence
1970: Top 4 most popular
states where current residence
were born
ALABAMA 84.99 70.0 Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, Florida
ALASKA 40.92 39.0 California, Washington, Texas, Oregon
ARIZONA 45.47 37.7 Illinois, Texas, California, Ohio
ARKANSAS 77.73 61.3 Texas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Mississippi
CALIFORNIA 57.48 53.8 Texas, Illinois, New York, Oklahoma
COLORADO 52.18 42.5 Kansas, Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa
CONNECTICUT 71.74 55.1 New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maine
DELAWARE 61.89 45.3 Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, Virginia
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 58.92 37.3 Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland
FLORIDA 48.41 35.2 New York, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Ohio
GEORGIA 79.41 55.2 Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, South Carolina
HAWAII 76.89 55.0 California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois
IDAHO 57.81 46.9 Utah, Washington, California, Oregon
ILLINOIS 77.85 67.1 Mississippi, Missouri, Wisconsin, Indiana
INDIANA 75.04 68.3 Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee
IOWA 82.02 71.7 Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Minnesota
KANSAS 67.94 58.2 Missouri, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Texas
KENTUCKY 84.57 70.3 Ohio, Tennessee, Indiana, Illinois
LOUISIANA 84.12 78.8 Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Alabama
MAINE 83.51 64.0 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Connecticut
MARYLAND 62.54 47.6 District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New York
MASSACHUSETTS 84.09 63.1 New York, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island
MICHIGAN 77.68 76.6 Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana
MINNESOTA 80.12 68.8 Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota
MISSISSIPPI 85.79 71.9 Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas
MISSOURI 76.07 65.9 Illinois, Kansas, Arkansas, Iowa
MONTANA 63.08 54.1 North Dakota, Minnesota, Washington, Idaho
NEBRASKA 76.72 65.6 Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota
NEVADA 38.08 24.3 California, Utah, Texas, New York
NEW HAMPSHIRE 66.78 42.7 Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, New York
NEW JERSEY 71.51 52.4 New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Virginia
NEW MEXICO 60.15 51.7 Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, California
NEW YORK 87.51 63.6 Pennsylvania, New Jersey, South Carolina, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA 83.89 58.5 South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, New York
NORTH DAKOTA 79.23 68.6 Minnesota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana
OHIO 76.03 75.1 Kentucky, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Indiana
OKLAHOMA 67.88 60.8 Texas, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri
OREGON 54.01 45.5 California, Washington, Idaho, Nebraska
PENNSYLVANIA 88.13 74.0 New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia
RHODE ISLAND 77.57 59.3 Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania
SOUTH CAROLINA 81.2 58.6 North Carolina, Georgia, New York, Virginia
SOUTH DAKOTA 75.33 65.1 Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Nebraska
TENNESSEE 79.17 61.0 Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, Virginia
TEXAS 78.94 60.5 Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, California
UTAH 75.37 62.3 Idaho, California, Colorado, Wyoming
VERMONT 75.14 51.1 New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut
VIRGINIA 68.84 49.9 North Carolina, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York
WASHINGTON 57.7 46.9 California, Oregon, Minnesota, North Dakota
WEST VIRGINIA 85.05 71.1 Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Kentucky
WISCONSIN 83.89 72.1 Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa
WYOMING 52.11 41.5 Nebraska, Colorado, Iowa, Texas
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Table A.3: Educational Spending on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Earnings Growtht−1 −0.144∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.142∗∗
(0.060) (0.058) (0.058)
(OE) Own Educational Spendingt−10 0.001
(0.003)
Own Education Spending2t−10 −0.000
(0.000)
(AE) Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.001
(0.003)
Average-weighted Education Spending2t−10 −0.000
(0.000)
(IE) In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.000
(0.002)
In-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 −0.000∗∗
(0.000)
(TE) Out-of-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.004
(0.005)
Out-of-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 −0.002
(0.001)
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Table 3(continued): Educational Spending on Earnings Growth
High school diplomat−10 −0.038∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.039∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.049∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.056∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
College (4+ years)t−10 0.081∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.032 −0.036 −0.039
(0.055) (0.057) (0.054)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.008 −0.005 −0.001
(0.056) (0.056) (0.063)
College Expendituret−10 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.092∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.194∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.062) (0.063)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 44 44 46
F-Statistic 556.69 857.51 960.87
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.736 0.707 0.688
Hansen Test 0.484 0.531 0.555
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.484 0.531 0.555
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma −0.038∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.039∗∗
Marginal Effect of Some College −0.049∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.056∗∗
Marginal Effect of College 0.081∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
Total Effect of Educational Spending -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Total Effect of Educational Spending (out-of-state) 0.001
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.4: Educational Spending on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Earnings Growtht−1 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054)
(OE) Own Educational Spendingt−10 −0.007
(0.004)
Own Education Spending2t−10 0.000∗
(0.000)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.009
(0.007)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × Some College 0.023∗∗
(0.010)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × College −0.037∗∗
(0.015)
(AE) Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.008∗
(0.004)
Average-weighted Education Spending2t−10 0.000
(0.000)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.013∗
(0.007)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × Some College 0.020∗
(0.011)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × College −0.031∗
(0.016)
(IE) In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.005
(0.006)
In-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 0.000
(0.000)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.009
(0.008)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × Some College 0.020∗
(0.012)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × College −0.032∗∗
(0.016)
(TE) Out-of-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.004
(0.005)
Out-of-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 −0.002
(0.001)
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Table 4(continued): Educational Spending on Earnings Growth
High Schoolt−10 −0.062∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗ −0.131∗∗
(0.057) (0.065) (0.052)
College (4+ years)t−10 0.280∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.090) (0.069)
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.033 −0.033 −0.017
(0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.024 −0.022 −0.021
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
College Expendituret−10 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.074∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.229∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.071)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 47 47 49
F-Statistic 478.76 661.72 617.27
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.789 0.781 0.748
Hansen Test 0.538 0.544 0.554
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.538 0.544 0.554
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma -0.030 -0.027 −0.040∗
Marginal Effect of Some College −0.079∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.079∗∗
Marginal Effect of College 0.147∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
Total Effect of Educational Spending −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ -0.003
Total Effect of Educational Spending (out-of-state) 0.001
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Figure A.1: Earnings Benefits for 25th percentile
(a) In-State Educational Spending Net Benefit: 25th percentile
(b) Spillover of Earnings Benefits from Out-of-State Educational Spending: 25th percentile
(c) Total Benefit from Educational Spending: 25th percentile
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Figure A.2: Earnings Benefits for 75th percentile
(a) In-State Educational Spending Net Benefit: 75th percentile
(b) Spillover of Earnings Benefits from Out-of-State Educational Spending: 75th percentile
(c) Total Benefit from Educational Spending: 75th percentile
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Table A.5: NAEP Test Score on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Earnings Growtht−1 −0.133∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Own NAEPt−10 0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Own NAEPt−10 × HS −0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Own NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Own NAEPt−10 × College −0.003
(0.002)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 0.001
(0.001)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS −0.003
(0.002)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × College −0.004∗∗
(0.002)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 0.000
(0.000)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS −0.001
(0.001)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College 0.000
(0.000)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × College −0.001
(0.001)
Out-of-state-weighted NAEPt−10 −0.000∗∗
(0.000)
High school diplomat−10 0.827∗∗ 0.694 0.097
(0.372) (0.484) (0.154)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.627∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.297) (0.369) (0.077)
College (4+ years)t−10 0.746∗ 1.289∗∗ 0.171∗
(0.418) (0.528) (0.102)
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Table 5(continued): NAEP Test Score on Earnings Growth
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.017 −0.012 −0.028
(0.046) (0.047) (0.045)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 0.019 0.012 0.020
(0.069) (0.069) (0.076)
College Expendituret−10 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.229∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.067)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 49 49 50
F-Statistic 3,348.57 1,756.25 2,147.97
AR(1) 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR(2) 0.698 0.673 0.758
Hansen Test 0.630 0.678 .531
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.630 0.678 .531
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma −0.030∗∗ −0.028∗ -0.023
Marginal Effect of Some College -0.033 -0.037 -0.009
Marginal Effect of College 0.069∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
Total Effect of NAEP Scores 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
Total Effect of NAEP Scores (out-of-state) 0.000∗∗
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.6: Educational Spending on Employment Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Employment Growtht−1 0.615∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062)
(OE) Own Educational Spendingt−10 0.001
(0.002)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.001
(0.005)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × SC −0.004
(0.003)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × C 0.004
(0.006)
(AE) Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.001
(0.002)
Average-weighted Education Spending2t−10 (1,000s) 0.052
(0.144)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.003
(0.005)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × SC −0.005
(0.004)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × C 0.004
(0.007)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × W −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
(IE) In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 (1,000s) 0.249
(2.043)
In-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 (1,000s) 0.112
(0.143)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.001
(0.006)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × SC (1,000s) 0.263
(4.397)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × C 0.005
(0.006)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × W −0.003∗∗
(0.001)
(TE) Out-of-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.003
(0.003)
Out-of-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 (1,000s) 0.204
(0.373)
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Table 6(continued): Educational Spending on Employment Growth
High school diplomat−10 −0.020 −0.029 −0.017
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 0.045∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.019
(0.022) (0.025) (0.020)
College (4+ years)t−10 −0.025 −0.028 −0.016
(0.034) (0.038) (0.023)
Percent of Labor Force Whitet−10 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.005 0.000 −0.000
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
% Born in current state of residence −0.003 −0.004 −0.012
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.056 −0.057 −0.053
(0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
College Expendituret−10 (1,000s) −0.024 −0.046 −0.013
(0.086) (0.089) (0.092)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Own Revenue as a % of GSPt−10 −0.000 −0.006 −0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) −0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) −0.007∗ −0.006 −0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 45 45 47
F-Statistic 3,286.86 2,534.33 7,821.68
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.219 0.218 0.219
Hansen Test 0.729 0.739 0.792
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.729 0.739 0.792
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma -0.020 -0.029 -0.017
Marginal Effect of Some College 0.045∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.019
Marginal Effect of College -0.025 -0.028 -0.016
Total Effect of Educational Spending -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
Total Effect of Educational Spending (out-of-state) -0.003
Note: HS: High School, SC: Some College, C: College, W: white. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.7: NAEP Test Score on Employment Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Employment Growtht−1 0.617∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
Own NAEPt−10 (1,000s) 0.136
(0.300)
Own NAEPt−10 × HS −0.001
(0.001)
Own NAEPt−10 × Some College −0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Own NAEPt−10 × College 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Own NAEPt−10 × % White (1,000s) 0.008
(0.007)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 (1,000s) 0.056
(0.354)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS (1,000s) −0.470
(1.067)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College −0.001∗
(0.001)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 × College 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Average-wegihted NAEPt−10 × % White (1,000s) 0.007
(0.008)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 (1,000s) −0.084
(0.118)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × HS (1,000s) −0.017
(0.218)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × Some College (1,000s) −0.120
(0.122)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × College 0.001∗∗
(0.000)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 × % White (1,000s) 0.019
(0.014)
Out-of-state-weighted NAEPt−10 (1,000s) −0.000
(0.000)
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Table 7(continued): NAEP Test Score on Employment Growth
High School Diplomat−10 0.170 0.114 −0.017
(0.232) (0.292) (0.045)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 0.405∗∗ 0.401∗ 0.035
(0.171) (0.218) (0.029)
College (4+ years)t−10 −0.518∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗
(0.165) (0.205) (0.051)
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 0.010 0.008 0.022
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
% Born in current state of residence −0.002 −0.003 −0.131
(0.003) (0.003) (0.083)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.052 −0.050 −0.055
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
College Expendituret−10 (1,000s) −0.016 −0.013 0.079
(0.081) (0.081) (0.090)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Own Revenue as a % of GSPt−10 −0.005 −0.010 −0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 −0.002 0.000 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.018 0.012 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) −0.006 −0.008∗ −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 43 43 44
F-Statistic 1,169.20 1,055.93 1,225.79
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.230 0.223 0.225
Hansen Test 0.874 0.828 0.970
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.874 0.828 0.970
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma -0.011 -0.013 −0.021∗∗
Marginal Effect of Some College 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.012
Marginal Effect of College -0.008 -0.012 0.001
Total Effect of NAEP Scores -0.000 0.000 0.000
Total Effect of NAEP Scores(out-of-state) -0.0000
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.8: Educational Spending and NAEP Test Scores on Earnings Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Earnings Growtht−1 −0.143∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
(OE) Own Educational Spendingt−10 −0.006
(0.005)
Own Education Spending2t−10 0.000
(0.000)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.010
(0.007)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × SC 0.022∗∗
(0.010)
Own Educational Spendingt−10 × C −0.036∗∗
(0.014)
Own NAEPt−10 −0.000∗
(0.000)
(AE) Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.007
(0.005)
Average-weighted Education Spending2t−10 0.000
(0.000)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.014∗∗
(0.007)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × SC 0.019∗
(0.011)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × C −0.029∗
(0.016)
Average-weighted NAEPt−10 −0.000
(0.000)
(IE) In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 −0.003
(0.006)
In-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 0.000
(0.000)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.006
(0.008)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × SC 0.018
(0.012)
In-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 × C −0.038∗∗
(0.015)
In-state-weighted NAEPt−10 −0.000
(0.000)
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Table 8(continued): Educational Spending and NAEP Test Scores on Earnings
Growth
(TE) Out-of-state-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.012∗
(0.006)
Out-of-state-weighted Education Spending2t−10 −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Out-of-state-weighted NAEPt−10 −0.000∗∗
(0.000)
High School Diplomat−10 −0.061∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.046∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
Some College (1-3 years)t−10 −0.152∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.105∗∗
(0.055) (0.063) (0.046)
College (4+ years)t−10 0.285∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.084) (0.068)
K-12 Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.010 −0.013 0.000
(0.058) (0.061) (.)
College Enrollment Ratet−10 −0.042 −0.033 −0.041
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
College Expendituret−10 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Taxes Per Capitat−2 0.001 0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Gov’t Expenditure as a % of GSPt−10 0.069∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Agriculture as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.258∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.077) (0.079)
Manufacturing as a % of GSP (contemp.) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650
Number of Groups (States) 50 50 50
Number of Instruments 48 48 51
F-Statistic 1,495.09 1,765.06 1,981.19
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.778 0.775 0.789
Hansen Test 0.654 0.644 0.577
Difference-in-Hansen Test 0.654 0.644 0.577
Marginal Effect of High School Diploma -0.023 -0.021 -0.031
Marginal Effect of Some College −0.071∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.059∗∗
Marginal Effect of College 0.157∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
Total Effect of Educational Spending -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Total Effect of Educational Spending (out-of-state) 0.007
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.80
A.3 Chapter 5 Appendix
A.3.1 Probit for Employment
For a more detailed looked into my dataset, I estimate the probability of being
employed for the individual. For this estimation all individuals are included, even
those who are not in the labor force. For this model, the dependent variable is an
indicator for whether or not the individual is employed. The probit model below
describes this estimation where Φ represents the cumulative normal distribution and
X is a vector containing all individual characteristics.
Prob(Employed) = Φ(X ′iβ) (A.1)
Results of this model are shown below in Table A.9. The results of this model show
what we would expect to see. If the individual is male, they are 8.4 percentage points
more likely to be employed compared to their female counterparts. As age increases
by 1 year, the individual is 0.52% more likely to be employed. If the individual is
white, they are 8.86 percentage points more likely to be employed than any other race.
Individuals who have ever been married are 1.3 percentage points more likely to be
employed than those who have never been married. If disabled, the individual is 30.3
percentage points less likely to be employed. If the individual has military experience,
they are 4.9 percentage points more likely to be employed. If the individual has a child
present in the home, they are 4.1 percentage points less likely to be employed. If the
individual is currently enrolled in school, they are 15.6 percentage points less likely to
be employed. Those with a high school diploma as their highest level of educational
attainment are 12.9 percentage points more likely to be employed compared to those
with less than a high school diploma. Individuals with 1-3 years of college are 21.4
percentage points more likely to be employed and individuals with 4+ years of college
are 27.6 percentage points more likely to employed compared to individuals with less
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than a high school diploma.
Overall, the probit results indicate that individuals who are male, older, white,
ever married, and who have military experience are more likely to be employed.
In addition, increasing one’s educational attainment increases their chance of being
employed while having a disability, being in school, or having a child present in the
home decreases their chance of being employed.
82
Table A.9: Employed - Probit Model
(1) (2)
Male 0.048∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
White 0.117∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Ever married 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Disabled -0.367∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Military Experience 0.062∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Child Present -0.092∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Currently in School -0.084∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
High School Graduate 0.129∗∗∗
(0.001)
Some College (1-3 years) 0.214∗∗∗
(0.001)
College (4+ years) 0.276∗∗∗
(0.001)
Moved out of State -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 2167881 2167881
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.102
Notes: Age only includes those aged 24-28. The education
variables indicate the highest level of education attained.
–Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses;
–∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.10: Educational Spending on Earnings - Heckman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K-12 Educational Spendingt−10 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
K-12 Education Spending2t−10 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.008∗∗
(0.004)
Educational Spendingt−10 × Some College 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
Educational Spendingt−10 × College 0.033∗∗∗
(0.003)
High School Graduate 0.280∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024)
Some College (1-3 years) 0.286∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
College (4+ years) 0.592∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024)
Inverse Mills ratio −0.528∗∗∗ −1.617∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Sigma 0.973 1.617 1.001 1.001 0.996
Chi-Squared 15,162.423 17,885.678 33,057.251 33078.73 33482.15
Demographic Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Total Observations: 1,245,788. Censored Observations: 844,008. Educational Spending is measured in 1,000s of dollars. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.11: Educational Spending on Earnings - State-level Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K-12 Educational Spendingt−10 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Average-weighted Educational Spendingt−10 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educational Spendingt−10 × HS 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Educational Spendingt−10 × Some College 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Educational Spendingt−10 × College 0.033∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High School Graduate 0.180∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Some College (1-3 years) 0.317∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
College (4+ years) 0.739∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
Taxes per Capitat−2 0.065∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.626∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.009) (0.042)
Sigma 0.996 0.996 1.029 0.998 1.029
Chi-Squared 33482.15 33477.10 36256.34 13739.19 36252.32
Demographic Variables Yes Yes Yes No Yes
State-level Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: Total Observations: 1,245,788. Censored Observations: 844,008. Educational Spending and taxes per capita are measured in
1,000s of dollars. The square of educational spending is included in (1) & (3) but has a coefficient of a statistically insignificant zero.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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